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I. INTRODUCTION
The False Claims Act (FCA) is arguably one of the federal government’s
most powerful weapons to fight against fraudulent government
contractors.1 The Act operates as a deterrent of mass destruction to prevent
third-party government contractors from submitting false or fraudulent
claims for payment to the federal government.2 Virtually any transaction
between a private business and the federal government falls under the
purview of the FCA.3 To put it another way, it is of the utmost importance
that any company doing business with the United States government

1. See Craig Margolis & Christina Ferma, The False Claims Act: Why Should A Civil Statute Matter
to Criminal Lawyers?, 31 CRIM. JUST. 26, 26–27 (2017) (“Penalties for violating the FCA are severe.”);
see also Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion From False Claims Act in Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST. (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 [https://perma.cc/C5JE-U3LJ] (“[T]he False Claims Act serves as
the government’s primary civil remedy to redress false for government funds . . . .”); see also S. REP.
NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269 (claiming the FCA is a “powerful
tool in deterring fraud”).
2. See Margolis, supra note 1, at 26 (“The FCA prohibits companies and individuals from
submitting false or fraudulent claims for payment to the government.”); see also S. REP. NO. 99-345,
at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269 (describing the FCA’s strength in deterring
fraud).
3. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2009).
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understands the FCA in order to shield itself from liability.4
The FCA painstakingly lays out seven detailed elements which create
liability under the act.5 Thankfully, however, federal courts have
consistently summed up the FCA as requiring three basic elements to
establish liability.6 First, a contractor must knowingly act fraudulently;
second, the contractor then must subsequently present to the federal
government a claim for payment; and, lastly, the claim must be fraudulent
and material to the government’s decision.7 However, Congress did not
intend the FCA to be a device used to punish a contractor for immaterial
misrepresentations.8
On one hand, proponents of the FCA claim the Act is the best weapon
the government has at its disposal to battle fraud.9 On the other hand,
critics posit that the FCA is too powerful and is used at times to police mere
contractual disputes.10 Interestingly, the Supreme Court noted the FCA
was not intended as an “all-purpose” statute to prosecute simple contractual
issues.11
Because the FCA is the federal government’s primary deterrent against
contractor fraud, it should not come as a shock to learn that between 2014
and 2018, the government brought 630 new lawsuits under the FCA—
around two new FCA suits per week.12 In the 2018 fiscal year alone, the
4. See Angela Bergman, No Consensus on Materiality: Courts Continue to Grapple With Escobar’s Key
Holdings, INSIDE THE FCA (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.insidethefca.com/no-consensus-onmateriality-courts-continue-to-grapple-with-escobars-key-holdings/ [https://perma.cc/FR4V-5JLY]
(noting how Escobar’s materiality standard creates a need for government contractors need to remain
vigilant of anything that could create incur liability for them under the FCA).
5. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G) (2009).
6. See Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic Evolves into
A Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 462 (1998) (providing three basic elements that trigger liability
under the FCA).
7. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 938 F. Supp. 399,
402 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (summarizing the elements that trigger liability under the FCA); see also id. (listing
the three basic elements of FCA liability as interpreted by most courts).
8. See Natasha Boyadzieva, The False Claims Act and the Escobar Decision: What is on the Horizon for
the Healthcare Industry, 16 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (discussing the FCA’s limitations).
9. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269.
10. See Jerad Whitt, Comment, I’m Not Calling You a Liar . . . : Implied Certification Theory Under the
False Claims Act, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 451, 451 (2017) (noting critics of the FCA worry the act will be
used to “punish run-of-the-mill breaches of contract”).
11. Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008).
12. See Jessica Sanderson & Michael Volkov, False Claims Act 2018 Year in Review—Making Sense
of the DOJ Fraud Statistics, JD SUPRA (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/false-claimsact-2018-year-in-review-62368/ [https://perma.cc/8Z5S-6GN6] (explaining how often the federal
government brought new cases under the FCA in 2018).
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federal government recovered over $2.8 billion from suits brought under
the FCA.13 In fact, the federal government earned more than $2 billion
each year over the past nine years from FCA lawsuits.14
Furthermore, the FCA allows relators—colloquially known as
“whistleblowers”15—to bring suits against allegedly fraudulent government
contractors on behalf of the federal government,16 and these relators can
continue a suit under the FCA even if the federal government elects not to
intervene.17 And, if the suit is successful, relators are entitled to a
percentage of the judgment or settlement under the FCA.18 Due to this
financial incentive, whistleblowers earned over $7 billion between 1987 and
2018 from suits brought under the FCA.19
The FCA is an important statute because it protects the federal
government from being defrauded by third parties.20 However, the FCA is
ambiguous on certain issues, and various circuit courts have not interpreted
these ambiguous issues consistently.21 Thus, the FCA has caused confusion
among the federal circuit courts over the years.22 In 2016, the Supreme
Court resolved a significant point of confusion with its decision in Universal
Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar (Escobar II),23 validating and
13. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD STATISTICS—OVERVIEW, https://www.justice.gov/civil/
page/file/1080696/download?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/9Y
ZL-SWC8].
14. See Sanderson & Volkov, supra note 12 (summarizing and graphing the number of, and the
amount recovered from, FCA cases from 1987 to 2017); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 13
(analyzing the settlement and judgment awards gained under the FCA by fiscal year).
15. See Protect the False Claims Act, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR. (Oct. 28, 2019 1:38 PM),
https://www.whistleblowers.org/protect-the-false-claims-act/
[https://perma.cc/9WNB-4WR4]
(discussing the qui tam provision, also known as the “whistleblower provision,” of the FCA). For the
purpose of this Comment, the term “relator” and “whistleblower” will be used interchangeably.
16. 31 U.S.C. § 3729–30 (2009–2010).
17. Id. at § 3730(c)(3).
18. Id. at § 3730(d).
19. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD STATISTICS - OVERVIEW, supra note 13.
20. See Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns That Do Not Shoot to Foreign Staplers: Has the Supreme
Court’s Materiality Standard Under Escobar Provided Clarity for the Health Care Industry About Fraud Under the
False Claims Act?, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1233–34 (2018) (noting the intention of the False Claims
Act).
21. See id. at 1234 (explaining how the varying state laws and regulations created differing circuit
interpretations of the FCA).
22. See id. (noting how the varying state laws and regulations created differing circuit
interpretations of the FCA).
23. See generally Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989
(2016) (holding under certain circumstances, cases may be brought using implied certification theory
under the FCA).
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allowing for claims to be made under the FCA using the implied false
certification theory.24
Under the implied false certification theory, the government or a
whistleblower may bring a claim under the FCA in instances where a
contractor does not disclose violations of statutory or contractual
obligations materially linked to the government’s decision to pay the
contractor.25 Circuit courts varied for years about whether the implied false
certification theory was a valid method to bring forth a claim under the
FCA.26 Yet, despite the Court clearing up the confusion surrounding the
implied false certification theory of the FCA, the Escobar decision created
even more confusion among the circuits regarding the issue of materiality.27
In Escobar, the Court described the FCA’s materiality standard as
demanding and emphasized how not all contractual terms of an agreement
are material to the federal government’s decision to pay a contractor.28 The
Court further placed a check on the FCA, stating that when a government
agency has actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and yet
continues to pay or pays the contractor in full, said payment is strong
evidence that the contractor’s noncompliance was immaterial to the
government’s decision to make a payment.29 The Court’s opinion in Escobar
seemingly posits that if the federal government has actual knowledge of a
contractor’s noncompliance and still pays the contractor, then the
noncompliance was not at all material in the government’s decision to pay.30
But, in the years since the Escobar decision, the issue of a government
agency’s continued payment or payment in full despite the agency’s actual

24. Id. at 1999.
25. Id. at 1995.
26. See Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certification, Interpretation, and the Quest for Fraud That “Counts”
Under the False Claims Act, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1811, 1820–21 (2017) (explaining the circuit split
regarding interpretation of the implied false certification theory under the FCA).
27. See Vince Farhat et al., Emerging Trends in False Claims Act Enforcement: 2018 Outlook, JD SUPRA
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/emerging-trends-in-false-claims-act-88123/
[https://perma.cc/T3AM-GE7H] (“Federal appellate courts have begun to interpret the Escobar
materiality standard in varying ways.”).
28. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003. Although the materiality standard originated in Escobar II, this
Comment will refer to the standard as the “Escobar materiality standard” for simplicity. Additionally,
the Escobar II decision will frequently be referred to as Escobar in the body of the text.
29. Id. at 2003–04.
30. See generally id. at 2003–04 (stating the government’s actual knowledge of noncompliance on
a contract and the government’s continued payment of the contract provide strong evidence that the
noncompliance was immaterial to the government’s decision to pay).
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knowledge of a contractor’s compliance created a split between the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits,31 and much confusion among the others.32
Since Escobar, the issue regarding the materiality of an FCA claim not only
caused confusion among the federal circuit courts, but also among the
companies who regularly contract with the federal government.33 Simply
put, these companies want some bright-line rules for the FCA.34 However,
despite the call from the business community for a consistent standard, and
a circuit split regarding materiality, the Supreme Court continually declines
to clarify the materiality standard it proffered in Escobar.35 A bright-line rule
regarding the FCA’s materiality standard is necessary.36 The existing
confusion surrounding the issue for private businesses and the high amount
of confusion among the federal circuit courts are evidence of this
necessity.37
This Comment suggests the Fifth Circuit’s position on the materiality of
an FCA complaint is the appropriate bright-line rule.38 Specifically, this
Comment suggests that when the government has actual knowledge of a
contractor’s noncompliance and, despite this knowledge, continues to pay
or pays the contractor in full, the FCA claim against the contractor must

31. Compare United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 660–63
(5th Cir. 2017) (explaining how a government agency’s payment in full or continued payment creates a
near insurmountable presumption that a contractor’s noncompliance was not material, causing the
complaint to fail for lack of materiality), with United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc.,
862 F.3d 890, 905 (9th Cir. 2017) (interpreting the Escobar materiality standard to mean that when the
government has actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and still pays the contractor, said
payment can still be proof of the noncompliance’s materiality to the government’s decision to pay);
see also Daniel Seiden, Fraud Law Circuit Splits Endure as Top Court Ruling Turns 3 (1), BLOOMBERG LAW
(June 14, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/federal-contracting/circuit-splits-overfraud-law-endure-as-top-court-ruling-turns-3 [https://perma.cc/N7M4-WEBH] (noting the Escobar
decision created circuit splits).
32. See Bergman, supra note 4 (discussing the confusion among the circuit courts regarding
Escobar’s materiality standard).
33. See Seiden, supra note 31 (describing the confusion felt in the business community about the
FCA).
34. Id.
35. See id. (noting the Supreme Court declined to hear cases regarding the FCA’s materiality
standard from either the Fifth or Ninth Circuits).
36. See id. (examining the need for a bright-line rule).
37. See id. (noting the confusion felt in both the circuit courts and business community).
38. See Vince Farhat, et al., supra note 27 (explaining the Fifth Circuit’s application of the
materiality standard).
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automatically fail for lack of materiality.39 A bright-line rule such as this
would ease the burden on the courts who adjudicate the immense number
of suits brought under the FCA. More so, this rule would also ease some
of the business community’s confusion and concern about accruing liability
under the FCA.40 Furthermore, this bright-line rule would force the federal
government to be more mindful of how it spends taxpayer funds, and this
rule would provide a reasonable check on the federal government’s ability
to earn billions from an extremely broad and powerful act.41 Finally, this
bright-line rule would end the current split between the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, providing clarity for all the circuits in the country.42
This Comment begins with a brief historical discussion of the FCA to
provide background information and context. Next, this Comment
discusses the Escobar decision and its impact on the FCA. Then, this
Comment discusses the Fifth Circuit’s position on a violation’s
immateriality to the government’s payment decision when the government
has actual knowledge of the contractor’s violation and continues to pay the
contractor regardless of this knowledge. This Comment will also discuss
the positions of a few other federal circuits with similar holdings to the
Fifth Circuit. This Comment will then examine the Ninth Circuit’s position
on the materiality of a claim under the FCA regarding the impact of the
government’s actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and the
government’s payment despite this knowledge. Finally, this Comment
posits the Fifth Circuit’s position as an appropriate bright-line rule regarding
materiality of a claim made under the FCA for the reasons stated in the
previous paragraph.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
During the chaos and turmoil of the Civil War, Congress drafted the FCA

39. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003–04
(2016) (describing the government’s actual knowledge of noncompliance on a contract and the
government’s continued payment of the contract provide strong evidence that the noncompliance was
immaterial to the government’s decision to pay).
40. See Seiden, supra note 31 (noting the confusion felt in the circuit courts and business
community).
41. See id. (validating the confusion and concerns felt by the business community).
42. See id. (noting the current split on the materiality standard as applied by the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits).
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to deter defense contractors from committing fraud.43 Defense contractor
fraud was incredibly rampant and bold during this time, with reports of the
United States Army receiving crates of sawdust instead of the weapons
needed to end the war.44 Thus, in 1863, Congress passed the FCA to
combat unscrupulous government contractors, and, upon President
Lincoln’s signature, the Act colloquially became known as “Lincoln’s
Law.”45
The FCA remained in its original form until the 1940s with the rise of
World War II.46 During this time, Congress saw fit to limit the substantial
power behind the Act.47 When Congress amended the FCA in 1943, it
placed a knowledge limitation on the Act.48 This “knowledge bar”
prevented relators from bringing claims under the FCA if the government
agency involved in the dispute had knowledge of the alleged fraud.49 The
1943 amendment culled the excessive number of FCA cases the government
prosecuted until Congress decided to substantially strengthen the Act in
1986.50
In 1986, Congress—to once again battle rampant fraud by defense
contractors—supercharged the FCA.51 The 1986 amendment created an
easier avenue for individuals to file FCA claims before a court and provided
an exemption to the knowledge bar, previously implemented with the 1943
43. See James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam
Provisions of the False Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and Their Application in the
United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35, 36 (1991)
(providing a history of the creation and application of the False Claims Act).
44. Id. at 35.
45. See Christopher L. Martin, Jr., Comment, Reining in Lincoln’s Law: A Call to Limit the Implied
Certification Theory of Liability Under the False Claims Act, 101 CAL. L. REV. 227, 236–37 (2013) (discussing
how “Lincoln’s Law” came into being).
46. See Christina Parel, Note, Striving for Consistency: Implied False Certification Theory After Escobar,
47 PUB. CONT. L.J. 461, 464 (2018) (“In 1943, Congress amended the FCA to bar qui tam actions
based on information already in the government’s possession.”).
47. See id. at 464 (describing how Congress weakened the FCA during the 1940s).
48. See Cynthia A. Howell, Rough Road Ahead for Businesses?—The Impact of the Supreme Court’s
Ruling in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 19 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 97, 99–100
(2017) (discussing the 1943 amendment to the FCA).
49. Id.
50. See id. at 100 (stating the scope of the FCA “significantly expanded” because of three
amendments starting in 1986).
51. See Rachel V. Rose, Appreciating the Impact of Universal Health Servs. Inc. v. United States ex
rel. Escobar in False Claims Act Actions, 63 FED. LAW. 42, 43 (2016) (summarizing what the 1986
amendment added to the FCA in order to strengthen the Act). See generally S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2–3
(1986) (discussing the government’s need to protect the Department of Defense from being defrauded
as the reason for drafting the 1986 amendment to the FCA).
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amendment. The 1986 amendment made it easier for FCA claims to be
brought in court and provided an exemption to the knowledge bar,
previously implemented with the 1943 amendment.52 Under the 1986
amendment, if the government’s knowledge of a contractor’s alleged fraud
came from a whistleblower, then that knowledge did not bar a suit from
being brought against an allegedly fraudulent contractor.53
The 2009 and 2010 amendments further increased the power of the
FCA.54 These amendments, combined with the amendment of 1986,
turned the FCA into one of the most overpowered statutory weapons at the
federal government’s disposal.55 The FCA now covers virtually all
transactions between the federal government and independent
contractors.56 More so, the Supreme Court further strengthened the FCA
by validating the implied false certification theory in Escobar—creating yet
another avenue for a company to accrue FCA liability.57
III. THE ESCOBAR DECISION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S MATERIALITY ELEMENT
In 2016, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of the implied false
certification theory by validating the doctrine in its landmark opinion in
Escobar.58 This decision was highly important for two significant reasons.
First, the Escobar decision ended a long-standing split among the federal
circuit courts regarding the validity of implied false certification

52. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986); False Claims Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 99-562,
100 Stat. 3153 (1986); see Martin, Jr., supra note 45, at 237 (discussing how the 1986 amendment to the
FCA expanded the Act’s power).
53. Martin, Jr., supra note 45, at 237; S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986).
54. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009);
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); see Howell,
supra note 48, at 100 (discussing how the FCA was expanded by the 1986, 2009, and 2010
amendments).
55. See Howell, supra note 48, at 100 (explaining the power’s granted to the FCA by the 1986,
2009, and 2010 amendments).
56. See generally The False Claims Act: A Primer, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 22, 2011), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/K84R-ETLP] (stating FCA liability accrues for anyone “who knowingly submits a false
claim to the government or causes another to submit a false claim to the government or knowingly
makes a false record or statement to get a false claim paid by the government”).
57. See Universal Health Servs. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016)
(holding, under certain circumstances, cases may be filed using the implied certification theory under
the FCA).
58. Id. at 1999.
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theory.59 Second, and the main focus of this Comment, the Escobar decision
created even more confusion between the circuit courts regarding the issue
of a claim’s materiality.60 This section will begin with a brief discussion of
how the Supreme Court ended the circuit splits regarding the implied false
certification theory. This section will then focus on how the materiality
standard proffered by the Escobar Court impacted the circuit courts’ rulings
on FCA cases.
A. Ending the Circuit Court’s Confusion with the Escobar Decision
Before the Escobar decision, federal circuits debated the validity and scope
of the implied false certification theory.61 This theory allows the
government or a whistleblower to bring a complaint under the FCA when a
contractor makes a claim for payment, but does not disclose any violations
of contractual obligations or statutory regulations that are implied and
material to the government’s payment.62 The circuit split prior to Escobar
was not a simple cut-and-dry split between two circuits; the implied false
certification theory split was between virtually all the circuits.63 Some
circuits recognized the theory in full, some only in part or only in certain
circumstances, and one outright denied the theory’s viability.64 Due to
widespread confusion about the implied false certification theory among the
circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Escobar case.65
In Escobar, the dispute hinged on two issues: (1) whether a claim under
the FCA could be made using the implied false certification theory, and
59. Jacob J. Stephens, Dicta Me This: Implied False Certification to Materiality Under the False Claims
Act Post-Escobar, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 273, 280–83 (2019) (discussing the split between the varying
circuits regarding on the implied false certification theory and how the Escobar decision resolved the
split).
60. See Bergman, supra note 4 (noting the circuit courts are not consistent in their rulings
regarding materiality of an FCA claim since the Escobar decision).
61. See Latoya C. Dawkins, Not So Fast: Proving Implied False Certification Theory Post-Escobar,
42 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 163, 165 (2017) (discussing in brief how the circuits were split on implied
false certification theory).
62. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995 (stating how the misrepresentation made by a defendant falls
within the definition of “false and fraudulent” in this explained situation).
63. See Megan E. Italiano, Note, An Implied Defense: Self-Disclosure Offers A Defense to the Expanded
False Claims Liability After Universal Health Services v. Escobar, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1943,
1951–55 (2019) (noting the history of implied false certification theory and how the theory varied from
circuit to circuit); see also Krause, supra note 26, at 1820–21 (discussing the split among the circuits about
the validity and scope of the implied false certification theory of the FCA).
64. See Krause, supra note 26, at 1820–21 (summarizing the circuit split regarding implied false
certification theory).
65. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1998.
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(2) whether FCA liability could only accrue if an express payment provision
is violated.66 The relators who brought the case alleged that Universal
Health Services violated the FCA under the implied false certification
theory.67 Specifically, the relators alleged that Universal Health Services did
not disclose that some of its employees lacked the proper medical training
and licensing required by Medicaid when the company submitted claims for
payment.68
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted summary judgment for Universal Health Services, holding none of
the statutory regulations the company violated were conditions of
payment.69 The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, taking the position
that statutory or contractual regulations could be either expressly stated
conditions of payment or implied conditions of payment.70 Upon Universal
Health Services’ appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to end the
conflict among the circuits regarding the validity of the implied false
certification theory.71
The Court held a claim could be brought under the FCA, in select
instances, using the implied false certification theory.72 The Court also
concluded not all conditions for payment are expressly stated. 73 There may
be some implied conditions, and violating implied conditions of payment
can trigger liability under the FCA.74 However, the Court carefully noted
that not all violations of even an express condition of payment can trigger
FCA liability.75 According to the Court, what triggered liability under the
FCA was not a violation of just any old contractual provision or statutory

66. See id. at 1995–96 (explaining how claims can be made under the FCA using the implied
false certification theory in some circumstances, and FCA liability is not limited to circumstances where
there is a violation of express conditions for payment).
67. Id. at 1997–98.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1998.
70. United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., 780 F.3d 504, 512–13 (1st Cir.
2015).
71. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1998–99 (discussing the Court’s reasoning for granting certiorari).
72. See id. at 1999 (holding implied false certification theory is a valid theory under which to
bring a claim under the FCA).
73. Id. at 2001.
74. See id. (holding the FCA does not limit liability to violations of express conditions for
payment only).
75. See id. (noting not all violations of express conditions will automatically trigger liability under
the FCA).
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regulation.76 Rather, what triggers FCA liability is whether the violated
provision or regulation was material to the government’s decision to pay the
contractor.77
The Court reasoned that focusing on whether or not a violated provision
or regulation was material to the government’s decision to pay a contractor
was the most efficient and effective method to adjudicate FCA claims.78
The Court wanted to prevent mass confusion among government
contractors, who are desperately trying to abide by both express contractual
conditions of payment and implied statutory conditions in order to avoid
liability.79 Furthermore, the Court wanted to avoid providing an avenue for
the federal government to turn every mere contractual violation or
inconsequential statutory violation into an FCA issue by labeling anything
and everything as a condition of payment.80 Thus, for FCA liability to be
triggered, a government contractor must violate an obligation or regulation
that is material to the government’s decision to pay.81 As Justice Thomas
wrote:
If the Government failed to specify that guns it orders must actually shoot,
but the defendant knows that the Government routinely rescinds contracts if
the guns do not shoot, the defendant has “actual knowledge.” . . . [A]
defendant’s failure to appreciate the materiality of that condition would
amount to “deliberate ignorance” or “reckless disregard” of the “truth or
falsity of the information” even if the Government did not spell this out.82

The Court’s decision allowing claims to be brought under the FCA by the
implied false certification theory in limited circumstances cleared up the

76. See id. (stating materiality is key to determining whether a provision or regulation is a
condition of payment).
77. See id. (determining materiality to be a key factor in determining whether a contractor
actually violated the FCA).
78. See id. (noting a condition of payment is determined by a materiality determination).
79. See id. at 2002 (discussing the complicated web of contractual obligations and statutory
regulations that companies must deal with in order to do business with the government).
80. See id. (explaining the need to avoid having the government label everything contractual
obligation or statutory regulation an express condition of payment).
81. See id. (holding a material obligation or regulation must be violated to the decision for the
government to pay).
82. See id. at 2001–02 (providing Justice Thomas’s example of unshootable guns and the ability
for the government to rescind such contracts for the knowledge that the contractor has of this material
issue).
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mass circuit confusion regarding the theory.83 However, the Court’s
decision in Escobar would again cause as much confusion among the federal
circuits as did the validity and scope of implied false certification theory.84
Only this time, the confusion stemmed from the Escobar Court’s own
materiality standard.85
B. The Escobar Decision’s Impact on Materiality of an FCA Claim
The Supreme Court ended one mass circuit split with its decision in
Escobar, but created a new one regarding the issue of materiality.86 In
Escobar, the Court stated the materiality standard of the FCA was
“demanding.”87 In the years since the Court’s decision in Escobar, the
federal circuit courts have inconsistently interpreted the Supreme Court’s
position on the materiality element of an FCA claim.88 In particular, the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits are the most at odds with one another regarding
this issue.89
As previously stated, the Supreme Court determined the materiality

83. See Tiphanie Miller, Materiality and the False Claims Act After Escobar, 35 DEL. LAW., Spring
2017, at 24, 25 (discussing briefly why the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Escobar and the Court’s
holding stating the implied false certification theory is valid).
84. See Bergman, supra note 4 (stating the circuit courts have struggled to come to a consensus
on an interpretation of Escobar’s materiality standard); see also Seiden, supra note 31 (discussing how
three years after the decision, the circuit courts are still divided regarding Escobar’s materiality standard);
Roderick L. Thomas & Michelle B. Bradshaw, False Claims Act: Escobar’s Materiality Language Gets More
Bite, WILEY (Nov. 2017) https://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item-False-Claims-ActEscobars-Materiality-Language-Gets-More-Bite.html [https://perma.cc/RL9C-WYZE] (discussing
how courts grapple with how to properly apply Escobar’s materiality standard).
85. See Mike Chow, Note, Payment Is Not Enough: Materiality in Implied False Certifications Under the
False Claims Act, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 573, 576 (2019) (noting how the Escobar Court ended the circuit
split regarding implied false claims theory, but created another one based on its very own holding on
materiality).
86. See Bergman, supra note 4 (stating courts are divided in interpreting the Supreme Court’s
holding on materiality of a claim made under the FCA); see also Seiden, supra note 31 (“The high court’s
refusal to further detail what a valid complaint must say to sufficiently allege falsity and materiality, . . .
arguably leaves two significant federal circuit splits in place on those issues.”).
87. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (2016)
(“The materiality standard is demanding.”).
88. See Farringer, supra note 20, at 1254 (explaining how the lower courts have trouble in
interpreting the materiality standard the Supreme Court set out in Escobar); see also Boyadzieva, supra
note 8, at 13 (discussing how the Supreme Court in Escobar did not lay out a bright line rule regarding
materiality of an FCA claim).
89. See Seiden, supra note 31 (noting the existence of a circuit split between the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits surrounding the issue of materiality of FCA claims post-Escobar).
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standard of an FCA claim to be “demanding.”90 The Court laid out some
guidelines to help explain just how demanding the materiality standard is.91
However, these guidelines were not bright-line rules, leading to variations in
circuit court interpretations. Currently, the materiality standard requires an
intensive examination of the facts involved in each complaint, and no one
factor is completely dispositive in the determination process.92
In Escobar, the Court observed that the FCA requires a contractor’s
misrepresentation or fraud to be “material to the other party’s course of
action.”93 To make this determination, the Court—as one should—first
looked to the FCA’s definition of materiality.94 The statute defines
materiality as “having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of
influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”95 The Court
noted this definition was rooted in common law traditions.96 The Court
pointed out, across various rulings, there could be no existence of fraud
where the fraud was not material to induce a party to act.97
However, the Court declined to specifically establish whether the FCA is
directly governed by § 3729(b)(4)—the statute’s actual definition of
materiality—or if common law traditions govern the statute.98 Today, clear
direction on the materiality aspect of an FCA claim would be very beneficial
for both the courts adjudicating FCA cases and businesses that regularly
contract with the government.99 Nevertheless, the Escobar Court decided
in its wisdom to not establish a bright-line rule just yet. Instead, it attempted
to take a middle path to the concept of materiality.100 The Court reiterated
90. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (describing the materiality standard of an FCA claim as
“demanding”).
91. See id. at 2001–04 (discussing the materiality standard of an FCA claim).
92. See Miller, supra note 83, at 25 (describing the materiality standard as set down in the Escobar
decision).
93. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001 (explaining the materiality standard of an FCA claim).
94. See id. at 2002 (noting the definition of materiality in the FCA).
95. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2018).
96. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999))
(providing the Court preserved the common law meaning of materiality in various rulings regarding
fraud and misrepresentation).
97. See id. (stating the Court preserved the common law meaning of materiality in various rulings
regarding fraud and misrepresentation).
98. Id.
99. See generally Seiden, supra note 31 (discussing the existence of a circuit split regarding the
Escobar materiality standard, and discussing how the business community would like some clear
direction on the issue as well).
100. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (discussing why the Court was not establishing whether
common law or the FCA’s direct definition govern the materiality of an FCA claim).
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that materiality is determined by the misrepresentation of a party’s decision
to pay and such a position on materiality was held across varying areas of
law.101
The Court continued to expound its position on materiality by laying out
some base guidelines for the lower courts to follow. First, the government
cannot just label any “statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement as a
condition of payment.”102 Next, the Court stated that an FCA claim lacks
materiality even if the government might have an option to not pay a
contractor upon learning of an instance of noncompliance.103 The Court
further noted that if a contractor’s noncompliance was “minor or
insubstantial,” then the noncompliance was also not material.104 Just
because the government claims something is material to its decision to pay
does not mean that it is necessarily so. The Court pointed out that, though
not dispositive, the government’s identification of a provision as a condition
of payment is highly relevant to a materiality determination.105
The Court then discussed what would be material in a claim made under
the FCA. The materiality of an FCA claim, according to the Court, includes
situations where a contractor knows the government never pays when a
specific statute or contractual obligation is violated.106 For example, a
company contracts with the federal government to provide gently
used, pre-owned vehicles for government agencies. The company knows
the federal government never pays on these contracts when a licensed
mechanic does not service the used vehicles. However, the company merely
hires self-taught mechanics to work on the vehicles. When the company
delivers the vehicles and requests payment from the federal government, the
company’s omission that non-licensed mechanics worked on the vehicles
instead of licensed ones would be material in determining of liability under
the FCA.
Notably, the Court did include a knowledge limitation on the government
regarding the materiality of an FCA claim. In instances where the
government actually knows about a contractor’s noncompliance and pays
101. See id. at 2002–03 (evidencing a similar position taken by both the Restatement of
Contracts and the Restatement of Torts).
102. Id. at 2003.
103. See id. (discussing the Court’s position on materiality).
104. Id.
105. See id. (noting the government’s position that a statute or contractual regulation as a
condition of payment is not automatically dispositive).
106. Id.
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the contractor in full for their work, said knowledge provides a strong
presumption that the noncompliance was not material to the government’s
decision to pay.107 Furthermore, if the government typically pays on certain
contracts despite its knowledge of noncompliance, such payment also
provides a strong presumption that the noncompliance was immaterial to
the government’s decision to pay.108
However, the Court, continuing down its middle road position, did not
provide this knowledge limitation with a very powerful bite.109 This is
because, although the government’s decision to pay or continue to pay a
contractor despite the government’s knowledge of noncompliance is strong
evidence that the noncompliance is immaterial, that evidence is not
completely dispositive.110 In other words, even though the government
completely knows about a contractor’s noncompliance and still pays the
contractor in full—which would imply to a reasonable person that the
noncompliance was immaterial—a court could still determine that the
contractor’s noncompliance was indeed material. Thus, a court could
impose FCA liability on a company the government’s knowledge about the
company’s noncompliance and payment to the company. This stance seems
self-contradictory. However, attempting to maintain common law
traditions, the Court did not directly establish any of the materiality factors
set out in Escobar as bright-line rules.111
The Supreme Court’s refusal to establish any bright-line rules regarding
the issue of materiality of an FCA claim caused variances in the circuit
courts’ decisions on FCA cases in the three years since the Escobar
decision.112 Nearly every circuit has a different stance on the materiality of
a claim made under the FCA, and thus there is no clear consensus
throughout the country on what is and what is not material in an FCA

107. See id. (stating the government’s actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and the
government’s decision to pay provides a presumption of the noncompliance’s non-materiality).
108. Id. at 2003–04.
109. See id. (providing the government’s actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance can
show that the noncompliance was immaterial).
110. See id. (noting the government’s actual knowledge is not completely dispositive in a
materiality determination of an FCA claim).
111. See id. at 2002–04 (stating common law traditions do influence a materiality analysis of an
FCA materiality claim, but not directly deciding whether it governs, and stating factors courts could
use to analyze the materiality element).
112. See Chow, supra note 85, at 576 (stating the Supreme Court set the stage for new circuit
splits involving materiality when it implied false certification theory).
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claim.113 In particular, the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits have the most
comprehensive split on the issue.114 So, in sum, the Escobar decision’s
impact on the issue of materiality of an FCA claim was a negative one that
caused confusion between the circuit courts and for the business that
regularly contracts with the government.115 This confusion has led both
businesses and attorneys alike to call for some bright-line rules to guide their
understanding of the FCA.116 To date, the Supreme Court has been deaf
to these calls.117
IV. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S STRICT POSITION ON MATERIALITY AND
SIMILAR STRICT POSITIONS OF OTHER CIRCUITS
Since Escobar, the federal circuit courts have inconsistently interpreted
the Supreme Court’s materiality factors of an FCA claim.118 Some circuits,
such as the Fifth Circuit, have strictly interpreted one facet of the Court’s
position on materiality, while others, such as the Ninth Circuit,
interpret this facet of the Court’s position more loosely.119 Specifically,
when it is shown that the government had actual knowledge of alleged
noncompliance and continued to pay or paid the defendant in
full, that evidence overwhelmingly, not just strongly, shows that
noncompliance was immaterial.120 The Fifth Circuit promulgated this
reasonable avenue of a potential bright-line rule for materiality in FCA
claims. This reasonable avenue of a potential bright-line rule for materiality
in FCA claims was promulgated by the Fifth Circuit after Escobar was

113. See Bergman, supra note 4 (discussing “there appears to be a deepening circuit split
developing regarding how plaintiffs must plead and prove materiality after Escobar”).
114. Seiden, supra note 31.
115. See id. (noting the existence of a clear circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
surrounding the issue of materiality of FCA claims post-Escobar).
116. See id. (interviewing Robert Rhoad about the current state of the FCA).
117. See id. (providing illustrating how the Supreme Court again rejected to hear cases regarding
the FCA’s materiality standard).
118. See Alex Hontos & Lauren Roso, False Claims Act: New Developments for an Old Law, DORSEY
& WHITENY LLP (Aug. 23, 2019, 9:20 AM), https://dorseyfca.com/false-claims-act-newdevelopments-for-an-old-law/ [https://perma.cc/6SW5-9GD8] (discussing the lack of Supreme
Court guidance about the materiality of an FCA claim post-Escobar).
119. See Jacklyn N. DeMar, From the Editor, 87 FALSE CLAIMS ACT & QUI TAM Q. REV. NL 1,
1 (2017) (discussing the differing interpretations of the Supreme Court’s materiality holding in Escobar
held by the circuit courts).
120. See id. at 1 (explaining the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of an FCA claim when the government
had actual knowledge of noncompliance and continued payment despite noncompliance).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021

17

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 6

610

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:593

decided.121 The Fifth Circuit’s position on materiality of an FCA claim’s
materiality is echoed by several other circuits, which in turn created a split
among the circuits taking a strict position and the Ninth Circuit’s more
relaxed position on the materiality of an FCA claim.122
This section will first discuss the Fifth Circuit’s position regarding FCA
claims, where the government had actual knowledge of an alleged
noncompliance and yet continued to pay or paid the contractor despite this
knowledge. Specifically, this section will look at two cases from the
Fifth Circuit—Abbot v. BP Exploration & Production,123 and United States ex
rel. Harman v. Trinity Industries,124 respectively. Next, this section will discuss
other federal circuit courts that have taken a similarly strict stance to the
Supreme Court’s materiality holding from Escobar.125 Specifically, it will
examine cases from the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits and discuss how
the position of these circuits’ position is similar to that of the
Fifth Circuit.126
A. The Fifth Circuit’s Strict Position on Materiality
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar, the Fifth Circuit
was presented with two cases involving the FCA. First in Abbott, and then
more conclusively in Harman, the Fifth Circuit held in favor of an allegedly
fraudulent contractor when the government had actual knowledge of the
contractor’s noncompliance and continued to pay the contractor.127 These
two cases, most notably Harman, highlight the strict interpretation of the

121. See United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 663 (5th Cir. 2017)
(drawing the lesson that “continued payment by the federal government after it learns of the alleged
fraud substantially increases the burden on the relator in establishing materiality”).
122. See Bergman, supra note 4 (discussing the continuing circuit split stemming from Escobar’s
materiality holding); see also Seiden, supra note 31 (noting the continuance of a circuit split regarding
materiality three years after the Escobar decision).
123. Abbott v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2017).
124. Harman, 872 F.3d at 645.
125. Bergman, supra note 4.
126. Id.
127. See Harman 872 F.3d at 667–68 (holding in favor of Trinity Industries due to a lack of
materiality in the whistleblower’s FCA claim because the government had actual knowledge of Trinity’s
noncompliance and continued to use Trinity’s products and pay Trinity); see also Abbott, 851 F.3d at 388
(holding in favor of BP because of a lack of materiality in the whistleblower’s FCA claim due to the
government’s knowledge of BP alleged noncompliance and continued payment to BP).
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FCA’s demanding materiality standard.128
In Abbott, a whistleblower brought a case against British Petroleum (BP),
claiming BP made false assertions of compliance with regulatory
requirements to the United States Department of the Interior (DOI).129
The whistleblower claimed BP did not possess all the government-required
documentation and engineer approval for its operation of an oil production
facility in the Gulf of Mexico.130 The whistleblower alerted the DOI of
BP’s potential fraud, which prompted the DOI to investigate the
allegations.131 Upon completing its investigation, the DOI deemed the
whistleblower’s complaint to lack merit and declined to revoke BP’s license
to operate the oil production facility.132 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas upheld BP’s motion to dismiss after
initially denying the motion pre-discovery, and the whistleblower
appealed.133
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on the materiality of the
claim.134 The Fifth Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court’s declaration that
the FCA’s materiality standard is demanding.135 Furthermore, case’s facts
drew the Fifth Circuit’s attention to the Escobar Court’s statements regarding
instances when the government has actual knowledge of a contractor’s

128. See Harman, 872 F.3d at 660–61 (noting the Supreme Court stated the materiality standard
of an FCA case is demanding and to look at the government’s actual knowledge and behavior in
determining materiality); see also Abbott, 851 F.3d at 388 (noting the Escobar decision described the
government’s actual knowledge and continued payment to an allegedly fraudulent contractor as
substantial evidence that the noncompliance was immaterial to the government’s decision to pay).
129. See Abbot, 851 F.3d at 386 (“Abbott subsequently filed . . . a complaint pursuant to
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) of the False Claims Act (“FCA”) on April 21, 2009, claiming, inter alia, that BP
falsely certified compliance with various regulatory requirements.”).
130. Id. at 386 (“During his employment, Abbott came to believe that BP did not have all of
the necessary documentation for the Atlantis and that many of the Atlantis documents that BP did
have were not approved by engineers as required by applicable regulations.”).
131. See id. (“As a result of his lawsuit, the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) began reviewing
BP’s compliance with those regulatory requirements in May 2009.”).
132. See id. (“DOI’s investigation culminated in a 2011 report . . . that concluded that ‘Abbott’s
allegations that Atlantis operations personnel lacked access to critical, engineer-approved drawings are
without merit,’ and that ‘Abbott’s allegations about false submissions by BP to [DOI] are unfounded.”).
133. See id. (“The district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of BP on all
claims.”).
134. See id. at 387–88 (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding on materiality in Escobar).
135. See id. (quoting Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989, 2001 (2016)).
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noncompliance and continues to pay the contractor.136 In this case, the
DOI knew of BP’s noncompliance with certain regulations.137 Despite this
knowledge, the DOI found no reason to suspend or terminate BP’s
operation of the oil production facility operation.138 The Fifth Circuit
rightfully observed how these facts presented strong evidence BP allegedly
violated the regulations was immaterial to the government’s decision to
allow BP to continue operations.139 Thus, the whistleblower’s complaint
did not meet the demanding materiality standard Escobar imposed, and the
district court did not err in granting summary judgment for BP.140
The Fifth Circuit’s ruling on the materiality issue in Abbott’s materiality
issue seems to be a strict, textualist interpretation of the materiality standard
set out in Escobar.141 The Fifth Circuit continued to strictly interpret the
Supreme Court’s stance on materiality in its decision in Harman, when that
case was brought before it several months after deciding Abbott.142 The
Harman decision clarified and firmly set the Fifth Circuit’s position on the
materiality of FCA claims when the government has actual knowledge of
the alleged noncompliance and yet continues to pay despite of this

136. See id. at 387–88 (noting the Supreme Court stated the government’s actual knowledge of
noncompliance and the government’s continued payment despite of this knowledge presents a strong
showing that the noncompliance was immaterial to the government’s payment).
137. See id. at 386 (describing how the whistleblower’s complaint triggered an investigation of
the allegations by the DOI allegations).
138. See id. (“The DOI Report also ‘found no grounds for suspending the operations of the
Atlantis . . . or revoking BP’s designation as an operator . . . .’”).
139. See id. at 388 (noting the DOI’s knowledge of BP’s noncompliance with certain regulations
and its immateriality in the DOI’s decision to allow BP to continue operations).
140. See id. (“The district court therefore correctly granted summary judgment on the FCA
claims in favor of BP.”).
141. Compare Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (finding it to be strong evidence that a violation
was immaterial to the government’s payment decision when the government continued to pay an
allegedly fraudulent contractor despite having actual knowledge of the contractor’s violation), with
Abbott 851 F.3d at 387–88 (stating the DOI’s knowledge of BP’s noncompliance with certain
regulatory statutes combined with the DOI’s decision to allow BP to continue operating in the Gulf
of Mexico created a substantial showing of evidence that compliance with those statutes was not
material in the DOI’s decision, and the whistleblower had no evidence to beat this substantial
evidence).
142. See United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 660–61 (5th Cir. 2017)
(explaining the Supreme Court’s position on the materiality of FCA claims as laid out in Escobar).
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noncompliance.143 In these instances, claims fail for lack of materiality.144
In Harman, a whistleblower brought an FCA claim against Trinity
Industries Inc. (Trinity), a manufacturer of highway guardrails for sale and
use by state governments throughout the United States.145 Since the
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) reimbursed the states which
purchased Trinity’s guardrails, Trinity was in effect paid by the federal
government and, thus, fell within the scope of the FCA.146 The
whistleblower, a customer and former competitor, alleged Trinity did not
inform the FHWA of some changes made to the guardrails and these
changes led to an increase in car accidents.147 In other words, the
whistleblower claimed that Trinity defrauded the federal government of
funds.148
The FHWA investigated the whistleblower’s allegations.149 Following
the investigation, the FHWA stated, despite Trinity’s omission of the
changes it made to the guardrails, it would continue to reimburse states
which purchased these products.150 Furthermore, the government declined
to intervene in the case, leaving the whistleblower to continue the litigation
on its behalf.151 Based on the FHWA’s investigation and decision to
continue payment, and because the government would not prosecute the
case itself, Trinity moved for summary judgment.152 The district court
denied this motion, as well as a writ of mandamus following a mistrial.153
Interestingly, though the district court stated it was not prepared to make a
ruling as a matter of law, the court did note the evidence substantially did

143. See id. at 663–65 (holding the whistleblower’s claim failed for lack of materiality in this case
because the government knew about the alleged noncompliance and still reimbursed the contractor
despite this knowledge).
144. See United States ex rel. Patel v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 312 F. Supp. 3d 584, 605
(S.D. Tex. 2018) (determining an FCA complaint to lack materiality when the government would have
the option to decline payment when it knew of the contractor’s noncompliance based on the Escobar
materiality standard and the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Harman).
145. Harman, 872 F.3d at 649–50.
146. Id. at 648.
147. Id. at 649–50.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 650.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 650–51.
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allude to immateriality of Trinity’s omission.154 However, the jury did not
see it that way and rendered a verdict in favor of the whistleblower.155
Following the verdict, the FHWA ordered independent testing of the
guardrails.156 When the results of the testing the guardrails were safe, the
FHWA stated it would continue to reimburse states for purchasing them.157
Based upon the independent testing and the FHWA’s announcement,
Trinity sought post-judgment relief, but was denied by the district court.158
Trinity then appealed to the Fifth Circuit seeking the post-judgment relief
denied to it by the district court.159
The Fifth Circuit, however, did not grant Trinity its sought-after postjudgment relief.160 Instead, it reversed the whole decision.161 The
Fifth Circuit interpreted the facts of the case to show that the
whistleblower’s claim did not meet the materiality standard set out in
Escobar.162 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit focused on the government’s
actual knowledge and actual behavior based on this knowledge.163 In other
words, because the FHWA knew about Trinity’s omission of the changes
made to its highway guardrails, and continued to reimburse states for
purchasing the guardrails, Trinity’s omission was immaterial to the FHWA’s
decision to pay.164
The Fifth Circuit reached its decision by not only strictly interpreting
Escobar’s materiality standard, but also by examining similar cases from other
federal circuits.165 The Fifth Circuit even examined the position of the
Ninth Circuit—which did not immediately find a lack of materiality in these
154. See id. at 651 (referencing the district court reprimanding the parties for the mistrial and
stating, “a strong argument can be made that the defendant’s actions were neither material nor were
any false claims based on false certifications presented to the government”).
155. Id. at 651.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 651 (5th Cir. 2017).
158. Id. at 651–52.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 652 (“[W]e need not consider the question of post-judgment relief . . . .”).
161. See id. at 652, 670 (finding Trinity to be “entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue
of materiality,” and reversing and remanding the case in favor of Trinity).
162. See id. at 660–62 (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding on materiality of FCA claims in
the Escobar decision).
163. See id. at 663–67 (examining the FHWA’s decision to continue to reimburse states for use
of Trinity’s guardrails, despite the FHWA’s actual knowledge of Trinity’s omission).
164. See id. at 665 (“[T]he ‘very strong evidence’ here of FHWA’s continued payment remains
unrebutted.”).
165. See id. at 661–63 (examining FCA cases involving similar situations from the First, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits).
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instances—but found its sister-circuit’s interpretation to be
unpersuasive.166 The Fifth Circuit determined, though these circuits did
not hold any one materiality factor to be dispositive, several circuits held
that when the government continues to pay a contractor despite an issue of
noncompliance it is very strong evidence that the noncompliance is
immaterial.167
To date, the Fifth Circuit has yet to take another case involving the FCA’s
materiality standard when the government has actual knowledge of a
noncompliance and continues to pay the contractor.168 So, as it stands, the
Fifth Circuit’s position regarding materiality of an FCA claim is a showing
by the defendant of the government’s actual knowledge of an alleged
noncompliance and its continued payment in spite of this knowledge creates
a virtually insurmountable burden for the plaintiff.169 This burden is so
substantial that it, in effect, defeats the materiality element of an FCA
claim.170
Furthermore, this substantial burden for the plaintiff only occurs in
instances when the government has actual knowledge and has made
payments or paid in full.171 In any other scenario, such as when the
government stops payment when it gains the required knowledge or does
not gain actual knowledge of the alleged noncompliance, the FCA claim is
166. See id. at 664–68 (determining the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Escobar materiality
standard to be unpersuasive).
167. See id. at 661–63 (explaining how the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits provided the
Fifth Circuit with the lesson that continued payment by the government after it learns of a contractor’s
noncompliance is highly strong evidence of the noncompliance’s immateriality and that said evidence
had not been rebutted in this case).
168. See Taylor Sample, With Widening Circuit Splits and Mounting Pressure Will 2019 See a PostEscobar Decision from the Supreme Court, JD SUPRA (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/with-widening-circuit-splits-and-33647/ [https://perma.cc/ZPZ5-LT2R] (pointing out
how the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari for the Harman case leaves as precedent the Fifth Circuit’s
position on materiality of an FCA claim when the government has knowledge of the alleged
noncompliance and continues to pay or pays the contract in full).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 665 (discussing how the plaintiff’s complaint should fail for lack of materiality
because of the strong evidence of the government’s knowledge of the noncompliance and its continued
reimbursement for states that used Trinity’s guardrails).
171. Compare United States ex rel. Lemon v. Nurses To Go, Inc., 924 F.3d 155, 161–62 (5th Cir.
2019) (determining an FCA claim to meet the Escobar material standard because the government did
not have actual knowledge of the alleged noncompliance when it made payments to the contractor),
with Harman, 872 F.3d 645, 665 (5th Cir. 2017) (determining the evidence of a complaint’s immateriality
to be virtually insurmountable when the government has actual knowledge of the contractor’s alleged
noncompliance and pays the contractor in full or continues to make payments).
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not so easily defeated for lack of materiality.172 The specific required
circumstances that would trigger this heavy burden on the plaintiff are
limited—the government must pay with full knowledge of the alleged fraud
that is actually occurring.173 Thus, this limitation makes it very difficult for
businesses to abuse the Fifth Circuit’s FCA materiality position, and makes
the position an efficient and effective method to quickly and reasonably end
an FCA dispute.174
B. Similar Strict Positions of Other Federal Circuit Courts
A few other federal circuit courts hold a similar position to that of the
Fifth Circuit regarding the immateriality of an FCA complaint when the
government actually knows of an alleged noncompliance and continues to
make payments on a contract.175 Most notably, the First, Third, and
Seventh Circuits virtually mirror the position of the Fifth Circuit.176 Those
circuit courts, like the Fifth Circuit, strictly interpret the Escobar Court’s
materiality guidelines, and in doing so highlight the efficiency and
effectiveness of such an interpretation on FCA cases.177
1.

The First Circuit’s Position

The First Circuit, in United States ex rel. Nargol v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.,178
held akin to the Fifth Circuit when it encountered a case in which the
government had actual knowledge of noncompliance and still reimbursed a
contractor.179 Nargol involved alleged Medicare fraud based on a
contractor’s omission of potential design flaws in metal hip
replacements.180 However, the government continued approving the
designs and purchasing the metal hip replacements despite learning of these

172. See United States ex rel. Broadnax v. Sand Lake Ctr., P.A., No. 8:13-cv-2724-T-27MAP, slip
op. at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 04, 2019) (limiting Harman to instances where the government has actual
knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and continues to pay the contractor or pays the contractor
in full despite this actual knowledge).
173. See id. at *4–5 (noting the circumstances when the Harman precedent would be triggered).
174. Id. at 5.
175. See Bergman, supra note 4 (listing and summarizing the differing federal circuit court
positions on the materiality of an FCA complaint).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. United States ex rel. Nargol v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 865 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2017).
179. See id. at 35–37 (determining the whistleblower’s complaint did not meet the FCA’s
demanding materiality standard as set out by the Escobar Court).
180. Id. at 31–34.
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potential flaws from the whistleblower.181 The United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts ruled for the defendant, leading to the
whistleblower’s appeal.182
The First Circuit took note of the Escobar Court’s determination that the
FCA’s materiality standard is demanding.183 The First Circuit specifically
looked to the factor stating that when the government has actual knowledge
of an alleged contractual violation and yet continues to pay on the contract,
then the government’s knowledge is strong evidence of the violation’s
immateriality to the government’s decision to pay.184 The record in Nargol
presented the First Circuit with evidence that the government gained actual
knowledge of the defendant’s alleged violation, but did not withdraw
approval of or cease reimbursement for the defendant’s metal hip
replacements.185 To the First Circuit, because the government did not
change its position once learning of the defendant’s alleged violations, it was
evidence that the alleged violations were immaterial to the government’s
decision to pay.186 In the end, the First Circuit dismissed all but one of the
whistleblower’s complaints because it found the misstatements in these
dismissed complaints to be immaterial to the government’s decision to pay
due to the government’s actual knowledge of the alleged violations.187
2.

The Third Circuit’s Position

The Third Circuit holding in United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genetech Inc.,188
was similar to the First Circuit’s position.189 In Petratos, the whistleblower
alleged Genentech committed fraud under the FCA by omitting some
potential side effects of a cancer drug in its submissions for Medicare

181. See id. at 35 (noting how the record showed the FDA continued to reimburse healthcare
providers who purchased and used the defendant’s products, after the FDA learned of the alleged
violations).
182. Id. at 34.
183. Id. at 34–35.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 35.
186. See id. at 35–36 (noting the Escobar materiality factors and the evidence of the government
maintaining its normal position with the defendant after learning of the alleged violations).
187. See id. at 36, 43 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of all but one of the whistleblower’s
complaints because they could not meet the exacting standards of a complaint made under the FCA).
188. United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481 (3d Cir. 2017).
189. See id. at 490–93 (holding the whistleblower’s complaint to lack the materiality element
required of an FCA complaint due to evidence of the FDA’s continued approval of Genentech’s cancer
drug for reimbursement).
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reimbursements.190 The United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey first held that the whistleblower’s claim failed because the claim
could not meet the falsity element of an FCA.191 Predictably, the
whistleblower appealed but the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.192
However, the Third Circuit did not affirm the ruling based on the district
court’s reasoning.193 Rather than deciding this case by looking at the falsity
element, the Third Circuit determined that the complaint did not meet the
FCA’s demanding materiality standard.194
In Petratos, the Third Circuit examined the record under the lenses of the
FCA’s demanding materiality standard.195 The Third Circuit specifically
noted that it is strong evidence of immateriality when the government
continues payment regardless of having actual knowledge of a
Interestingly, the Third Circuit interpreted this
noncompliance.196
materiality factor to also mean an omission was immaterial to the
government’s payment decision when a relator admits the “[g]overnment
would have paid the claims with full knowledge of the alleged
noncompliance.”197 The Third Circuit even posited that if a relator did not
plead that the government’s actual knowledge of the noncompliance would
influence its decision to pay, then the alleged noncompliance was immaterial
as well.198
3.

The Seventh Circuit’s Position

The rollercoaster ride that was United States v. Sanford-Brown, Limited199

190. Id. at 485.
191. Id. at 486.
192. Id. at 494.
193. See id. at 489 (describing how appellate courts may affirm a case based upon reasoning
different than that of the district court and affirming the district court’s decision because the claim did
not meet the demanding materiality requirement of an FCA complaint).
194. Id.
195. See id. at 489–90 (examining the case record based on Escobar materiality).
196. See id. at 481, 489 (discussing the Escobar materiality factors).
197. Id. at 481–90.
198. See id. at 490 (noting the Third Circuit’s belief that the FCA’s demanding materiality
standard should be implemented at the pleading stage and highlighting how the federal circuit courts
are becoming split on whether to implement the FCA’s demanding materiality standard at the pleading
or trial stages of an action—which provides the basis of this argument for the bright-line rule to
implemented at the trial stage).
199. United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2016).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/6

26

Goddard: With Actual Knowledge Comes Lack of Materiality

2021]

COMMENT

619

also brought the Seventh Circuit to a similar position.200 Sanford-Brown was
originally decided in 2015 by the Seventh Circuit in favor of the defendant,
because the complaint was made utilizing the implied false certification
theory, which the Seventh Circuit did not recognize at the time.201
Granting the writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court took the case.202 But,
the Court quickly remanded Sanford-Brown back to the Seventh Circuit,
having ruled on a similar issue in the Escobar decision just eleven days
prior.203 On remand, however, the Seventh Circuit again held for the
defendant.204
The Seventh Circuit reached its final decision in Sanford-Brown based on
the Supreme Court’s holding in Escobar.205 The Seventh Circuit first
determined that the relator did not present a proper FCA complaint under
implied false certification theory.206 More importantly though, the
Seventh Circuit determined that because the government—even with
knowledge of the alleged noncompliance—continued to do business with
the defendant, the alleged noncompliance was immaterial to the
According to the
government’s decision to make payments.207
Seventh Circuit, this evidence entitled the defendant to summary
judgment.208

200. See id. at 447 (holding summary judgment proper for the defendant because the plaintiffrelator could not meet the FCA’s demanding materiality standard based off evidence of the
government’s actual knowledge of the alleged violation and its continued payment despite this
knowledge).
201. See United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 714 (7th Cir. 2015) (ruling in favor
of the defendant because the plaintiff did not adequately prove an FCA violation).
202. See United States ex rel. Nelson v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 136 S. Ct. 2506 (mem.) (2016)
(granting writ of certiorari).
203. See id. (“Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of [Escobar].”) (citation omitted).
204. See Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d, at 447–48 (holding for the defendant because the
plaintiff-relator did not properly make a claim based on implied false certification theory and because
the plaintiff-relator could not meet the FCA’s demanding materiality standard).
205. See id. at 447 (“This matter is before us on remand from the United States Supreme Court
for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in [Escobar].”) (citation omitted).
206. See id. (concluding the conditions of “the implied false certification theory” were not met
by the plaintiff-relator).
207. See id. (discussing how evidence of the Government’s continued business with the
defendant shows evidence of the alleged noncompliance’s immateriality).
208. See id. (determining “summary judgment [to be proper] because Nelson failed to establish
the independent element of materiality . . . .”).
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The position taken by the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits vary subtly
from the Fifth Circuit’s position, but all these circuits strictly interpreted the
Escobar Court’s ruling on the materiality of an FCA claim. In each of these
cases, the respective federal circuit court based its decision not solely just on
the government’s actual knowledge, but also on the government’s actual
behavior based on its knowledge.209 In each case, the circuit courts
reasonably determined that when the government learned of an alleged
noncompliance and did nothing to stop paying the violating contractor, then
the contractor did nothing to defraud the government.210
This common theme shows that, contrary to the Supreme Court’s belief,
a bright-line rule for the materiality element of an FCA claim is possible.211
Specifically, a rule making just one of the Escobar materiality factors
dispositive. Stated another way, when the government has actual knowledge
of an alleged violation or noncompliance and continues to pay or pays the
contract in full despite this actual knowledge, then that alleged violation or
noncompliance is not material to the government’s decision to pay. In these
limited circumstances, an FCA claim should be dismissed for lack of
materiality.

209. See United States ex rel. Nargol v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 865 F.3d 29, 34–35
(1st Cir. 2017) (noting the Government’s actions upon gaining actual knowledge of the defendant’s
alleged violations showed the defendant’s alleged violations did not materially affect the Government’s
decision to pay); see also United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 492
(3d Cir. 2017) (explaining how under the FCA “it is the Government’s materiality decision that
ultimately matters.”); see also Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d at 447 (determining, based on Escobar, that
the government’s behavior is key to a materiality determination in an FCA case).
210. See United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 660–61 (5th Cir. 2017)
(indicating a strong showing of the immateriality of a violation when the Government decides to pay,
having actual knowledge of a contractor’s alleged misrepresentation, noncompliance, or violation and
still continues to pay the contractor despite this actual knowledge); see also Nargol, 865 F.3d at 34–35
(determining the Government’s continued business with the defendant, despite its knowledge of
noncompliance, to show noncompliance was immaterial to the government’s decision to pay the
defendant); see also Petratos, 855 F.3d at 489–90 (finding the Government would have continued
payment had it learned of Genentech’s omissions and showing the omission would “not [be] material
to the Government’s payment decision”); see also Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d at 447 (examining the
record to find that despite gaining knowledge of the noncompliance, the Government chose to not
penalize the defendant in any way).
211. See generally Krause, supra note 26, at 1813–14 (noting how, in an attempt to keep with
“common-law concepts,” the Supreme Court in Escobar “declined to set brightline rules” for any of
the materiality factors it laid out).
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V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S BROAD POSITION ON MATERIALITY
AND A POTENTIAL SHIFT IN ITS POSITION
The strict interpretation of the Escobar Court’s materiality factors is not
shared by every federal circuit however.212 The Ninth Circuit, for example,
holds a looser interpretation of the FCA’s demanding materiality standard.
In the Ninth Circuit, even if the government has actual knowledge of a
contractor’s noncompliance and pays the contractor despite this knowledge,
the courts may still find the noncompliance to meet the materiality element
of an FCA claim.213 Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, a contractor can accrue
FCA liability more easily than in those federal circuits which strictly interpret
the Escobar Court’s materiality standard.
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Broad Position on Materiality
The Ninth Circuit first took this broad position in United States ex rel.
Campie v. Gilead Sciences.214 However, it has recently shown a shift in its
position on the materiality of an FCA claim.215 Furthermore, as will be
212. See Matthew K. Organ & Takayuki Ono, Escobar Decision Continues to Affect Major FCA
Cases, THE ATTORNEYS OF GOLDBERG KOHN (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.whistleblowers
attorneys.com/blogs-whistleblowerblog,escobar-affects-major-fca-cases [https://perma.cc/HMA99F48] (discussing how the Escobar decision created splits regarding the materiality of a claim when the
government has actual knowledge of an instance of noncompliance and still continues to pay the
contract, and how some federal circuits find the aforementioned government knowledge and payment
to meet the FCA’s materiality standard and other federal circuits do not); see also Matt Curley, FCA
Deeper Dive: Escobar and Its Aftermath—Part II, INSIDE THE FCA (May 23, 2017), https://www.inside
thefca.com/fca-deeper-dive-escobar-and-its-aftermath-part-ii/
[https://perma.cc/G5U5-GPXY]
(explaining how the federal circuits are split on the issue of whether an FCA claim should automatically
fail for lack of materiality when the government has actual knowledge of the contractor’s
noncompliance and continues to pay the contractor or does not change its position in any way).
213. See Anne K. Walsh, Ninth Circuit Revives False Claims Act Case Applying Escobar Materiality
Standard, HYMAN, PHELPS & MCNAMARA: FDA L. BLOG (June 17, 2017), http://www.
fdalawblog.net/2017/07/ninth-circuit-revives-false-claims-act-case-applying-escobar-materiality-stan
dard/ [https://perma.cc/AN6L-CQZB] (examining the Campie case and discussing the Ninth Circuit’s
position that evidence of a noncompliance’s materiality is shown when the government has actual
knowledge of the noncompliance and continues to make payments to the contractor).
214. See United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 899 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“We construe the Act broadly . . . .”).
215. See Craig D. Margolis, Tirzah S. Lollar, & Michael E. Sammuels, Ninth Circuit Finds
Continued Government Payments Show that Alleged False Statements Are Not Material, ARNOLD & PORTER
(July 11, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/07/ninth-circuit
-finds-continued-government-payments [https://perma.cc/R6E5-TFSH] (noting how a recent
Ninth Circuit case may be signaling change regarding the materiality of an FCA claim when the
government continues to make payments despite having actual knowledge of a contractor’s
noncompliance).
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explained in this section, the Ninth Circuit in Campie did not need to rule
that it is still evidence of a noncompliance’s materiality when the
government actually knows of the noncompliance and continues to pay
despite this knowledge. The Ninth Circuit’s position on the materiality of
an FCA claim is based, in part, on prior Ninth Circuit precedent calling for
a broad interpretation of the Act.216 This precedent, stemming from United
States ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix,217 still controls the Ninth Circuit’s
judgment on FCA cases, despite being possibly preempted by the Escobar
Court’s ruling.218
In Campie, two relators alleged Gilead Sciences, Inc. (Gilead) violated the
FCA by making false claims about the quality of its HIV drugs in its
compliance forms submitted to the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).219 Furthermore, the relators alleged that because of these false
claims, Gilead received billions of dollars in Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursements.220 Specifically, the relators alleged Gilead used chemicals
from unapproved manufacturers in China, and hid or altered this fact in its
compliance communications with the FDA.221 Gilead did eventually seek
the FDA’s approval for its Chinese source though.222 However, according
to the relators, the company used the Chinese chemicals prior to seeking
this approval.223 More so, the relators alleged that Gilead falsified its
records in order to gain the FDA’s approval of the Chinese source.224
To make matters worse, Gilead retaliated against one of the
whistleblowers, Jeff Campie, by terminating his employment after he
brought up concerns of Gilead’s alleged misrepresentations to the
government.225 Adding to its suspicious behavior, Gilead then requested
the whistleblower to sign an agreement barring him from bringing an action
against the company under the FCA.226 Upon refusing, the two relators
216. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 899 (9th Cir. 2017) (maintaining the Ninth Circuit’s precedent of
broadly construing the FCA in order to combat any and all forms of fraud against the government).
217. See generally Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1170 (“The False Claims Act . . . is not limited to such
facially false or fraudulent claims for payment.”).
218. See United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Inst., 909 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018)
(Smith, J., dissenting) (holding Hendow was overruled by the Escobar materiality standard).
219. Campie, 862 F.3d at 895–98.
220. Id. at 897.
221. Id. at 896.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 897–98.
226. Id. at 898.
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brought this case in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California.227
The district court twice dismissed the relators’ complaint for failure to
state a claim.228 According to the district court, the relators’ FCA claims
did not show that Gilead’s misrepresentations were material to the
government’s decision to pay.229 However, the Ninth Circuit granted
appeal because of the Escobar Court’s ruling on the materiality of an FCA
claim occurring shortly after the district court rendered its decision.230 The
Ninth Circuit determined the district court had erred when it ruled against
the relators’ FCA claims.231 And, in a stunning reversal, the Ninth Circuit
found for the relators.232
To reach its decision, the Ninth Circuit first looked to precedent within
its own jurisdiction.233 The Hendow case holds that the Ninth Circuit should
construe the FCA very broadly in order to protect the government from
fraud.234 Specifically, in regards to materiality, the court in Hendow held all
that mattered was that a causal chain between the false statement and the
government’s payment.235 Relying on this precedent, the Ninth Circuit
proceeded to examine not only the FCA broadly, but the FCA materiality
factors posited by the Escobar Court as well.236
The Ninth Circuit heavily relied on the Hendow precedent because the
district court determined the payor agency, the Center for Medicare and

227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 899.
230. See id. at 895–96 (noting the recency of the Escobar decision following the district court’s
ruling in Campie as a reason for the Ninth Circuit to hear the case).
231. See id. at 907 (“[R]elators allege more than the mere possibility that the government would
be entitled to refuse payment if it were aware of the violations . . . .”).
232. See id. at 909 (reversing the holding of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California and finding for the relators).
233. See id. at 898–99 (stating the Hendow precedent governs the analysis of FCA complaints in
the Ninth Circuit).
234. See Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1170 (determining the FCA was designed to protect the
government from any and all types of fraud and was given a broad scope by Congress in 1986).
235. See id. at 1174 (finding a causal chain of connection between the alleged violation and the
government’s decision to pay on a contract is necessary for a claim to meet the materiality element of
the FCA).
236. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 904–05 (discussing the Escobar materiality factors of an FCA claim
and construing them to find evidence of materiality even when the “[g]overnment pays a particular
claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated”).
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Medicaid Services (CMS), technically was not defrauded for payment.237
Furthermore, Gilead claimed the FDA approved its HIV drugs, providing
evidence that its claims for payment to Medicare and Medicaid were not
false.238 According to Gilead, the FDA became aware of its noncompliance
after approving the Chinese source but still continued to approve Gilead’s
HIV drugs despite knowing of the noncompliance.239 Gilead further
claimed that the FDA’s approval shielded the company from FCA liability,
utilizing a case from the Fourth Circuit to in an attempt to persuade the
Ninth Circuit.240 However, because of the Hendow precedent, the
Ninth Circuit was neither impressed nor persuaded.241
The Ninth Circuit thought it insignificant that the payor agency was not
technically the agency to which Gilead made misrepresentations.242 It first
observed that both the FDA and CMS were overseen by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.243 From this basic connection, the
Ninth Circuit deduced that essentially Gilead committed fraud against the
Department of Health and Human Services.244
Next, the Ninth Circuit, mirroring the Third Circuit in Petratos, held that
it was not the difference in federal agency that mattered, but whether or not
the defendant induced the government to pay based on a
misrepresentation.245 In other words, what were the government’s actions

237. See id. at 903 (discussing why the district court dismissed the relators’ complaint and how
it erred according to Hendow).
238. See id. at 903–04 (noting Gilead’s defense to the relators’ FCA claims).
239. Id. at 906.
240. See id. at 903–04 (describing Gilead’s defense to the relators’ FCA claims based on
Fourth Circuit precedent). See generally United States ex rel. Rostholder v. Omnicare, Inc., 745 F.3d 694,
701–02 (4th Cir. 2014) (determining FCA cases are barred when the payment submissions are made to
Medicare and Medicaid, and the FDA has already approved the drug).
241. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 904 (holding the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, and thus the defense’s
argument, to be unpersuasive based of prior Ninth Circuit precedent).
242. See id. at 903 (asserting the distinction between the government agencies do not matter,
only that a false statement was made to the government for payment).
243. Id. at 903.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 903 (holding the government’s actions based on a contractor’s misrepresentations
in a statement for payment mattered, rather than what individual agency paid and the one to which the
misrepresentations were made); see also United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481,
492 (3d Cir. 2017) (discussing the importance of the government’s actions in determining the
materiality of an FCA claim and holding the government’s actions to control in the materiality analysis).
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based on the misrepresentation?246 Based on this logic, a reasonable person
would believe that the Ninth Circuit would then find a misrepresentation to
be immaterial when the government had knowledge of the
misrepresentation and continued to pay despite knowing. However, the
Ninth Circuit held otherwise.247
When examining the materiality element of the relator’s FCA claim, the
Ninth Circuit did utilize the materiality factors laid out by the Escobar
Court.248 However, the Ninth Circuit examined these factors broadly.249
The Ninth Circuit evidenced this broad interpretation by holding that the
government’s continued payment despite having actual knowledge of a
contractor’s noncompliance was the inverse of what the Supreme Court
reasoned this action to be.250
In Campie, the Ninth Circuit held “proof of materiality can include”
situations where the government makes continued payments to a contractor
despite it having actual knowledge of the contractor’s violation of certain
requirements.251 This is contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in
Escobar, which held this type of scenario to be evidence of the violation’s
immateriality.252 Furthermore, this line of reasoning goes against the
Ninth Circuit’s logic that it should be the government’s actions that dictate
whether or not a violation was material to its payment decision.253 More
importantly, however, the Ninth Circuit did not have to stretch the Escobar
materiality factors to find against Gilead.
The Ninth Circuit found that Gilead made misrepresentations to the

246. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 903 (utilizing Hendow to hold that it matters not which federal
agency was misled, but only that evidence can be shown to connect the false statement for payment to
the government’s action of payment).
247. See id. at 905 (determining evidence of an FCA claim’s materiality where the government
pays a claim in spite of its actual knowledge of a violation by the contractor).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 905–06.
250. Compare id. at 905 (finding proof of materiality to be in situations where the government
continues to pay a claim in spite of having actual knowledge of a contractor’s violation), with Escobar,
136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (determining the government’s payment, despite its actual knowledge of a
contractor’s violation or noncompliance with an obligation, to be a factor showing the violation or
noncompliance’s immateriality).
251. Campie, 862 F.3d at 905.
252. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003.
253. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 903 (determining the focus should be on whether the government
was fraudulently induced to pay based on the contractor’s false statement).
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FDA in order to obtain the approval of its Chinese source.254 In other
words, the government did not have actual knowledge of Gilead’s
violations.255 Any payment made by CMS to Gilead were fraudulently
induced by Gilead’s initial misrepresentations to the FDA.256 Gilead
actively covered up its Chinese source to gain FDA approval of its HIV
drugs—so, from the beginning it was virtually impossible for the
government to have actual knowledge.257 Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not
need to hold the government’s continued payments after gaining actual
knowledge of a violation to be evidence of the violation’s materiality in an
FCA claim.258 The government in Campie did not have actual knowledge,
and so its continued payments to Gilead did not constitute a scenario similar
to the Escobar Court’s materiality factor showing immateriality.259
Gilead did try to use the government’s continued purchases of the drugs
after the FDA learned of Gilead’s violations as a defense.260 However,
Gilead’s defense was terminally flawed because upon learning of these
violations the FDA materially changed its position, ultimately calling for a
recall of Gilead’s drugs.261 And, Gilead eventually stopped using its
Chinese source, making any later payments by the government after the
stoppage insignificant to the issue in the case.262 Moreover, Gilead used
the Chinse source well before gaining FDA approval, and made
misrepresentations to the FDA in order to gain the ability to be paid by the
CMS.263 Gilead’s initial use of the Chinse source and its misrepresentations
destroy any chance of the government having actual knowledge.264 This is

254. See id. at 905 (noting Gilead’s alleged false claims were made to the FDA in order to gain
its approval for Gilead’s HIV drugs).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 906–07 (discussing how it is unclear exactly when or if the government gained
actual knowledge of Gilead’s violations).
258. Id.
259. See id. at 906–07 (noting, from the record and from the positions of the parties in
contention, it is very unclear whether the government had actual knowledge of Gilead’s alleged
violations).
260. Id. at 906.
261. See id. at 906 (examining the evidence to find instances of the FDA warning Gilead of
impurities, sending Gilead a letter of noncompliance, and of two recalls of Gilead’s drugs).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 896.
264. See id. at 905 (“Mere FDA approval cannot preclude [FCA] liability, especially where . . .
the alleged false claims procured certain approvals in the first instance.”).
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because the payor agency was paying Gilead based on government approval
gained through fraud.265
In the end, the Ninth Circuit determined a genuine question of fact
existed regarding whether or not the government had actual knowledge of
Gilead’s noncompliance—justifying its reversal of the district court’s
dismissal.266 As to Gilead’s defense, the Ninth Circuit found that there
might be other reasons why the FDA continued its approval of Gilead’s
drugs—though these other reasons were not stated in the opinion.267 Thus,
the government’s continued payments after learning of Gilead’s violations
could still be evidence of the violation’s materiality on its decision to
continue payment.268
The Ninth Circuit made the correct ruling in Campie.269 It is clear from
the record in this case that Gilead intentionally defrauded the government
of billions of dollars by making misrepresentations to the FDA in order to
be reimbursed by the CMS.270 However, the Ninth Circuit did not have to
reach this decision by finding evidence of the government’s actual
knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and its continued payment to
the contractor to be material in triggering FCA liability. Gilead utilized an
unapproved source in China for its HIV drugs and then made false
statements to eventually gain approval for this source.271 From the very
beginning, Gilead concealed its source from the government until a couple
of relators brought this to the attention of authorities.272 Gilead clearly
committed a violation under the FCA, and the Ninth Circuit was correct in
reversing the district court’s dismissal. But, the Ninth Circuit did not need
to broadly interpret the Escobar materiality factors of an FCA claim to
achieve its result.
Without actual knowledge, the government’s continued payment to a
noncompliant contractor is not evidence of the noncompliance’s materiality

265. Id.
266. See id. at 906–07 (discussing whether or not the government had actual knowledge of
Gilead’s violations and when it gained said knowledge).
267. See id. at 906 (holding there are many possible reasons why the FDA continued to approve
Gilead’s HIV medication after gaining actual knowledge).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See id. at 895–99 (detailing the allegations against Gilead).
271. Id. at 895–99, 906 (discussing how Gilead defrauded the government and finding that it
obtained its FDA approval fraudulently).
272. Id. at 895–99.
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on the government’s decision to pay.273 With actual knowledge, it is.274
In the Ninth Circuit, however, the government’s actual knowledge and its
continued payment in spite of this knowledge is clearly not dispositive.275
The Ninth Circuit may have so broadly interpreted the Escobar materiality
factors in Campie because of the Hendow precedent.276 After all, the Circuit
did shirk off a common theme among the federal circuits, which provided
the makers of medications approved by the FDA with a shield from FCA
liability in its pursuit of a reversal.277 However, as previously stated, the
record showed Gilead intentionally defrauded the government to gain
approval for its drugs, making both the FDA shield and the continued
payment with actual knowledge defenses moot.278
B. A Potential Shift in the Ninth Circuit’s Position
In the two years since Campie, the Ninth Circuit has signaled that its
position on the materiality of an FCA claim may be changing.279 A dynamic
duo of cases lit the signal in 2018—United States ex rel. Berg v. Honeywell
International, Inc.280 and United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Institute,281
respectively. It may now actually be that Campie is an outlier case in the
post-Escobar world.

273. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (finding it to be evidence of a noncompliance or violation’s
immateriality when the government knows of said noncompliance or violation and continues to pay
or pays the contract in full despite of this knowledge).
274. See id. (stating actual knowledge is evidence of noncompliance’s materiality).
275. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 905 (finding proof of materiality in an FCA claim to include
situations where the government has actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and still makes
payments to the contractor in spite of this knowledge).
276. See id. (determining, based on precedent from Hendow, that the Ninth Circuit should
interpret the FCA broadly to encompass all forms of fraud, and holding it to be evidence of a violation’s
FCA materiality even when the government continues to pay on a contract despite actually knowing
of said violation).
277. See id. at 906 (noting how other federal circuits are hesitant to rule on FCA claims involving
drug manufacturers when the FDA has approved of the manufacturer’s drug); see D’Agostino v. Ev3,
Inc., 845 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2016) (discussing how FDA approval shielded a drug manufacturer from
FCA liability); see Petratos, 855 F.3d at 490 (explaining the impact of FDA on FCA claims).
278. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 895–99, 904–08 (discussing Gilead’s alleged actions and finding
Gilead made fraudulent misrepresentations in order to gain the FDA’s approval).
279. See generally Margolis, et al., supra note 215 (discussing the potential impact of Berg on other
Ninth Circuit cases, based on the Ninth Circuit in Berg finding evidence of immateriality when it was
shown the government had actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and continued to pay
the contractor in spite of this knowledge).
280. United States ex rel. Berg v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 740 F. App’x 535 (9th Cir. 2018).
281. Rose, 909 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2018).
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The first case to signal the Ninth Circuit’s new position on the materiality
of an FCA claim was Berg.282 In Berg, the issue was not specifically about
the materiality of an FCA claim.283 Rather, the case turned on whether the
relators stated any part of an FCA claim.284 The relators alleged that
Honeywell International, Inc. (Honeywell), made false claims regarding the
installation of equipment to the United States Army for payment.285 The
United States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary
judgment for Honeywell, ruling the relators failed to meet any element of
an FCA claim.286 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling.287
Regarding the materiality of an FCA claim, the court in Berg correctly
interpreted the Escobar materiality factors as intended by the Supreme
Court.288 The Ninth Circuit found the Army to have actual knowledge of
Honeywell’s allegedly fraudulent activity for an extended period of years.289
Furthermore, the record showed that the Army continued to pay Honeywell
for its services during this period of actual knowledge.290
The Ninth Circuit determined this evidence to show Honeywell’s alleged
fraud to be immaterial to the Army’s decision to continue payment.291
Thus, because the relators could not meet the FCA’s demanding materiality
element—and because they could not meet any of the elements at all—the
Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Honeywell.292
282. See Berg, 740 F. App’x at 538 (holding the Army’s actual knowledge of Honeywell’s alleged
noncompliance and its continued payment to Honeywell for a period of years to provide evidence that
the alleged noncompliance was immaterial to the government’s decision to pay).
283. Id. at 537.
284. See id. at 537 (noting the relators are appealing a motion of summary judgment against
them).
285. Id.
286. See id. at 537–39 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing the district court’s reasoning for finding that
the relators failed to meet any required element of an FCA claim).
287. See id. (agreeing with the district court’s findings that the relators failed to meet any element
of an FCA claim).
288. See id. at 538 (acknowledging the immateriality of an alleged violation on the government’s
decision to pay when the government has actual knowledge of said violation and still continues to pay
on a contract in spite of its actual knowledge).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See id. (finding evidence of the Army’s actual knowledge of Honeywell’s alleged
noncompliance and the Army’s continued payment to Honeywell to show Honeywell’s alleged
noncompliance to be immaterial to the Army’s continued payment).
292. See id. at 537–39 (finding the relator’s presented no triable fact for any of the required
elements for an FCA claim and affirming summary judgment in favor of Honeywell).
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However, the Ninth Circuit in Berg did not expressly overrule its prior
holding from Campie regarding an FCA claim’s materiality.293
The Ninth Circuit next revisited the issue of an FCA claim’s materiality
in Rose.294 In Rose, a group of relators alleged the Stephens Institute violated
an incentive compensation ban in the conditions for its federal funding.295
That case was originally dismissed by the district court, but found new life
thanks to the Escobar decision.296 The Ninth Circuit then heard the case to
provide clarification on Escobar’s impact on Ninth Circuit precedent,
affirming the district court’s ruling.297
Providing some clarification, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
Hendow precedent still controlled in the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of an FCA
claim, with Escobar merely creating a “gloss” over the Hendow precedent.298
In other words, the Ninth Circuit would continue to broadly interpret the
FCA.299 Essentially, all that is required for a violation to be material is just
some form of a causal connection between a contractor’s violation and the
government’s decision to pay.300
The Ninth Circuit did acknowledge that evidence of the government’s
actual knowledge of a violation and its continued payment to a contractor
despite this knowledge was strong evidence of the violation’s
immateriality.301 However, upon examination of the record, the
Ninth Circuit found no evidence showing the government had actual
knowledge of the Stephens Institute’s alleged violation.302 Thus, the

293. See id. at 538–39 (discussing the Escobar materiality factors and finding evidence of the
Army’s actual knowledge of Honeywell’s noncompliance and the Army’s continued payment to
Honeywell to show the noncompliance to immaterial in its payment decision, but not mentioning its
prior ruling to the contrary in Campie).
294. See Rose, 909 F.3d at 1018–23 (examining the Escobar materiality factors and comparing
these factors to the record in Rose).
295. Id. at 1016.
296. Id.
297. See id. at 1017–23 (discussing the application of the Escobar standard for FCA claims and
affirming the district court’s granting of summary judgment for Honeywell).
298. See id. at 1020 (viewing Escobar “as creating a ‘gloss’ on the analysis of materiality”).
299. Id.
300. See United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006)
(noting the requirement of a causal chain between the alleged false statement for payment and the
government’s decision to make the payment).
301. Rose, 909 F.3d at 1019.
302. Id. at 1021.
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Ninth Circuit did not directly revisit this issue or expressly overrule
Campie.303
It is worth noting that the dissent in Rose staunchly argued Escobar
overruled Hendow.304 In his dissent, Judge Smith determined that Hendow
no longer held control over the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of FCA claims.305
Judge Smith rightfully pointed out that the Hendow precedent heavily relies
on express conditions of payment to be determinative in a materiality
analysis.306 This is contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Escobar,
which declared express conditions of payment to be relevant in a materiality
analysis, but not dispositive.307
The dissent argued the Hendow precedent requires the question of
materiality to be, “whether payment is conditioned on compliance . . . .”308
however, the correct question as determined from the Escobar dissent’s
understanding of the materiality factors, is “whether the [g]overnment would
truly find such noncompliance material to a payment decision.”309 Because
the Supreme Court in Escobar determined the materiality question to be
based off the government’s actions instead of what it labels as a condition
of payment, the Hendow precedent regarding materiality has been
overruled.310
The Ninth Circuit is potentially shifting the position it took on the
materiality of an FCA claim in Campie.311 This is evidenced by the Circuit’s
303. See id. (noting the record’s lack of evidence regarding the government’s actual knowledge
of the alleged violation, and thus the Ninth Circuit could not analyze the case based on this materiality
factor).
304. See id. at 1023–24 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing Escobar overruled Hendow’s materiality
analysis because the Escobar analysis focuses on whether the government found the alleged violation to
be material to its decision to pay, rather than a mere a condition of payment).
305. See id. at 1023 (“Hendow’s materiality holding is no longer good law after Escobar.”).
306. See id. (discussing how Hendow held express conditions of payment to be evidence of
materiality).
307. See id. (citing Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1996
(2016)).
308. Id. at 1024.
309. Id. (emphasis added).
310. See id. (noting the majority erred in finding Escobar did not overrule the Hendow precedent
controlling the materiality analysis of an FCA claim in the Ninth Circuit, because the Hendow analysis
runs contrary to how the Supreme Court determined the materiality of analysis to be in Escobar).
311. See Carolyn Pearce, Why Escobar Materiality Rule Applies to California FCA, LAW360 (Sept. 5,
2018),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1079561/print?section=california
[https://perma.
cc/NE6S-NRD4] (discussing the increasing influence of the Supreme Court’s ruling on an FCA claim’s
materiality in Escobar on both the federal circuit level and on the state level in California); see Margolis,
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acknowledgment in Berg and Rose that the government’s actions based on its
actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance should determine an
FCA claim’s materiality.312 Also, the Hendow precedent is starting to lose
its grip on the Ninth Circuit, as is shown by the majority’s stretch to keep it
alive313 and the dissent’s well-reasoned argument against it.314 The only
thing holding the Ninth Circuit back might be that it is waiting for a case
similar to Campie in order to officially change its position, as the result of the
Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Berg and Rose support the argument that Campie
is an outlier.315
VI. WHY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S STRICT POSITION SHOULD BE THE
BRIGHT-LINE RULE FOR MATERIALITY OF AN FCA CLAIM
The section argues why the federal circuits—or the Supreme Court, if it
decides to take another FCA case on the issue316—should adopt a position
et al., supra note 215 (describing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Berg, in which the Circuit determined
evidence of the Army’s continued payments to Honeywell, despite the Army’s knowledge of
Honeywell’s alleged violation for years, to be evidence of the violation’s immateriality to the Army’s
decision of continued payment).
312. See United States ex rel. Berg v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 740 F. App’x 535, 538 (9th Cir. 2018)
(determining it to be strong evidence of a violations immateriality to the government’s decision to pay
a contractor when the Army had actual knowledge of Honeywell’s alleged violations for years and
continued to pay Honeywell despite this knowledge); see also Rose, 909 F.3d at 1019–21 (acknowledging
it to be strong evidence of a violations immateriality to the government’s decision to pay a contractor
when the government has actual knowledge of the contractor’s alleged violations and continues to pay
despite this knowledge, but not finding this situation in the case record).
313. See Rose, 909 F.3d at 1019–20 (believing Hendow was “not clearly irreconcilable” with
Escobar, despite admitting Hendow only explicitly considered express conditions for payment, but
considering that Hendow might have been decided differently in light of Escobar) (quoting Miller v.
Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003)).
314. See id. at 1023–24 (arguing Escobar overruled Hendow’s materiality analysis because Hendow
focuses the analysis on express conditions of payment, but Escobar holds that the focus should be on
the government’s action based on the alleged violation, noncompliance, or misrepresentation).
315. See Berg, 740 F. App’x at 538 (acknowledging the Army’s continued payments to
Honeywell, and its knowledge that Honeywell was allegedly noncompliant with its contract for years,
to be evidence of the noncompliance’s immateriality on the Army’s decision to pay Honeywell); see also
Rose, 909 F.3d at 1019 (finding immateriality to be shown when the government has actual knowledge
of a violation and continues to pay on a contract regardless of this actual knowledge); United States ex
rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 905 (deeming it possible for the government’s actual
knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance or violation to still be evidence of the noncompliance or
violation’s materiality to the government’s decision to pay the contractor).
316. See generally Brian P. Dunphy & Nicole E. Henry, Third Time’s Not the Charm: Supreme Court
Again Declines to Weigh in on Escobar’s “Materiality” Standard, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/third-time-s-not-charm-supreme-court-again-declines-to-wei
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on the materiality of an FCA claim similar to that of the Fifth Circuit.317
Specifically, FCA claims should fail for lack of materiality when the record
shows the government had actual knowledge of a contractor’s
noncompliance with an obligation and, despite this knowledge, continued
to pay the contractor. This bright-line rule is limited, reasonable, and would
efficiently ease the burden on the courts in deciding FCA cases.
This section will first discuss how this bright-line rule is in line with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Escobar.318 Next, the section will posit the
potential benefits such a simple bright-line rule would provide to the federal
courts and business which regularly contract with the government. Lastly,
this section will discuss the potential public policy implications such a
bright-line rule could promote.
A. This Bright-Line Rule Aligns with the Supreme Court’s Holding in Escobar
The Supreme Court in Escobar held the FCA’s materiality standard to be
a demanding one.319 That is because across many areas of the law,
materiality focuses on the actions of the recipient of the
misrepresentation.320 For example, in contracts law, misrepresentations are
material if they are likely to cause a reasonable person to act.321 Similarly,
in the law of torts, misrepresentations are material if a reasonably prudent
person would find the misrepresentation to be influential in making his or
her decision.322 Furthermore, Black’s Law Dictionary defines material to be
“[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person’s
decision-making . . . .”323 A bright-line rule automatically ending an FCA
claim when it is shown that the government had actual knowledge of a
gh-escobar-s-materiality [https://perma.cc/5G7B-LZQ6] (discussing how the Supreme Court has
declined to build upon or clear up the confusion caused by the Escobar ruling for a third time).
317. See United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 670 (5th Cir. 2017)
(holding the government’s continued payments to a contractor despite knowledge of violations creates
a presumption of immateriality; see also United States ex rel. Lemon v. Nurses To Go, Inc., 924 F.3d
155, 156 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[I]f the Government regularly pays a particular claim in full despite actual
knowledge that certain requirements were violated, . . . that is very strong evidence that those
requirements are not material.”) (quoting Universal Health Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel Escobar, 136 S.
Ct. 1989, 2003–04 (2016)).
318. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (holding the government’s payment of a claim is evidence
that certain requirements are not material).
319. Id.
320. See id. at 2002 (noting materiality is virtually the same across varying areas of law).
321. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a)–(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
323. Material, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021

41

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 6

634

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:593

contractor’s noncompliance with an express or implied obligation and
continued to pay the contractor regardless of this knowledge is aligned with
the Escobar Court’s holding and the varying legal definitions of materiality.
This bright-line rule emphasizes the government’s actual knowledge and
its actions based off its actual knowledge. It does not heavily focus on
conditions of payment as the Hendow precedent does,324 but instead focuses
on whether the government was induced to act based on the contractor’s
alleged noncompliance or violation. After all, the Escobar Court did state
conditions of payment were relevant, but not dispositive in an FCA
materiality analysis.325
Furthermore, this bright-line rule is limited. The rule requires the
government to actually have knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance,
and the government’s continued payment despite this knowledge, for it to
be triggered. This limitation is shown by the Fifth Circuit in Harman, in
which the court held it was clear and reasonable that the alleged
noncompliance was in fact immaterial to the government’s payment
decision because said payment was given after the government gained actual
knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance; it was clear and reasonable that
the alleged noncompliance was in fact immaterial to the government’s
payment decision.326 However, as the Fifth Circuit has also demonstrated,
if it is found that the government did not have actual knowledge of a
contractor’s noncompliance and made payments, then such lack of actual
knowledge of the noncompliance is evidence of the noncompliance’s
materiality.327
Moreover, the Court in Escobar noted the FCA’s materiality analysis, while
rigorous, was not so fact intensive that it could automatically survive

324. See United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Inst., 909 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018)
(discussing how Hendow heavily relied on conditions of payment in the FCA materiality analysis it
posited, and arguing that Hendow does not align with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Escobar).
325. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003–04 (determining the government’s conditions of payment
to be relevant in a materiality analysis of an FCA claim, but not dispositive because not all conditions
of payment are actually material to the government’s decision to pay a contractor).
326. See United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 665 (5th Cir. 2017)
(finding evidence of the government’s continued payment to Trinity, despite having actual knowledge
of Trinity’s misrepresentations, to be evidence that the misrepresentations were immaterial to the
government’s decision to pay).
327. See United States ex rel. Lemon v. Nurses To Go, Inc., 924 F.3d 155, 161–62 (5th Cir. 2019)
(deciding a contractor’s violation of an obligation to be material to the government’s decision to pay
the contractor when it was found that the government did not have actual knowledge of the
contractor’s violation).
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summary judgment.328 This means a bright-line rule making one of the
Escobar materiality factors dispositive, is possible. And, as the Escobar Court
held, there are multiple methods under which the government or relators
can bring an FCA claim in court.329 This bright-line rule, by focusing on
whether the noncompliance was influential or induced the government to
act, may be used either if express claims are violated or if the claim was
brought under the implied false certification theory.
B. This Bright-Line Rule Would Benefit Federal Courts and Government
Contractors Alike
Currently, there is a split among the federal circuits regarding the
materiality of an FCA claim when the government has actual knowledge of
a contractor’s alleged noncompliance with a statutory, regulatory, or
contractual obligation and continues to pay the contractor regardless of this
knowledge.330 Increasingly, federal courts are finding the government’s
continued payment, despite having actual knowledge of a contractor’s
noncompliance with an obligation, is evidence the noncompliance was
immaterial to the government’s decision to pay.331 In other words, a
328. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004 n.6 (rejecting the contractor’s argument that the materiality
analysis is “too fact intensive” to allow for summary judgment or motions to dismiss in FCA cases).
329. See Johan H. Krause, Holes in the Triple Canopy: What the Fourth Circuit Got Wrong, 68 S.C.L.
REV. 845, 847–48 (discussing how an FCA claim may be brought by a contractor’s violation of an
express condition of payment, and how the implied false certification theory evolved and became
another theory under which an FCA claim may be brought).
330. See Chow, supra note 85, at 581–82 (discussing the split among the circuits regarding the
materiality of an FCA claim); see also Scott Roybal & Joseph Barton, Feature Comment: 2017 Civil False
Claims Act Update, GOV’T CONTRACTOR, Nov. 15, 2017, at 1, https://www.sheppard
[https://perma.cc/HR7S-MFN5]
mullin.com/media/publication/1681_TGC%2059-42-345.pdf
(discussing the potential circuit split the Ninth Circuit created by holding the government’s continued
payment to a contractor regardless of its actual knowledge of the contractor’s violation of an obligation
to be evidence of the violation’s materiality to the government’s decision to pay).
331. See Bergman, supra note 4 (noting a majority of federal courts are taking “a more stringent”
stance toward the Escobar materiality factor’s impact on the materiality analysis of an FCA claim);
Steven A. Neeley & Brian Wagner, After Escobar, Materiality Matters, THE CONTRACTOR’S PERSPECTIVE
(Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.contractorsperspective.com/false-claims-act/after-escobar-materialitymatters/ [https://perma.cc/7BX4-DBSN] (explaining the Escobar decision’s materiality position and
its impact on businesses); J. Andrew Jackson & Ryan P. McGovern, Judge Cites Escobar Materiality
Standard, Vacates $350 Million False Claims Act Judgment, JONES DAY (Jan. 2018), https://www.jonesday.
com/en/insights/2018/01/judge-cites-iescobari-materiality-standard-vacates [https://perma.cc/5H
KJ-DEZV] (discussing how a federal district court strictly interpreted the Escobar materiality factors to
find against the relators due to the relators’ failure to prove the government did not have actual
knowledge of the alleged violations by a nursing home operators despite its continued payment, which
showed the violations to be immaterial).
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growing number of federal circuits are showing one of the Escobar
materiality factors to be dispositive. The Ninth Circuit’s contrary holding
in Campie, however, has not been directly overturned.332 Meaning, the
Ninth Circuit continues to ignore the Supreme Court’s determination that
strong evidence of a noncompliance’s immateriality to the government’s
payment decision exists when the government has actual knowledge of the
noncompliance and continues payment.333
Moreover, since the Escobar decision, businesses which regularly contract
with the federal government have also experienced confusion in trying to
understand the FCA and how to avoid accruing liability under it.334 Right
now, a defense utilizing the government’s knowledge of the contractor’s
alleged violation and its continued payment to the contractor to show the
violation was immaterial to the government’s decision, is not viable
depending on where an FCA claim is filed.335 Thus, government
contractors are robbed of a common defense throughout the country to a
federal law—the law we all must commonly follow336—if an FCA claim
against them is filed in a federal district court in California instead of in
Texas.337
Even though the Escobar Court thought none of the materiality factors it
posited were dispositive, a growing number of federal circuits seem to hold
otherwise.338 These circuits, such as the Fifth Circuit, hold so by placing
the onus of the materiality analysis on the government’s actions that were
332. Campie, 862 F.3d at 905; see also Daniel Wilson, 9th Circ. Won’t Revisit FCA Materiality Dispute,
LAW360 (Nov. 26, 2018, 10:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1104764/9th-circ-won-trevisit-fca-materiality-dispute [https://perma.cc/8GBF-PS4D] (stating the Ninth Circuit did not
directly revisit the issue of FCA materiality it was confronted with in Campie, and thus did not alter its
position regarding FCA materiality).
333. See Italiano, supra note 63, at 1960 (discussing how the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Gilead
runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Escobar).
334. See Seiden, supra note 31 (discussing how businesses regularly contracting with the
government have been confused about how to properly avoid liability under the FCA since Escobar).
335. Compare United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 667–68 (5th Cir.
2017) (determining the government’s actual knowledge of Trinity’s alleged fraud to be evidence of the
alleged fraud’s immateriality for the government’s decision to continue contracting with Trinity), with
Campie, 862 F.3d at 905 (finding proof of a noncompliance’s materiality to the government’s decision
to pay in situations when the government has actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance, even
though the government continues to pay or pays the contractor in full despite this knowledge).
336. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing federal law as the supreme law of the land and
essentially making it the general law all must follow within the borders of the United States).
337. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
338. See Krause, supra note 26, at 1813–14 (discussing the weaknesses of the Escobar decision
because it did not fully or clearly define materiality and did not hold any factor to be dispositive).
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based on the contractor’s alleged violation of an obligation.339 Due to this
growing trend, both businesses and the federal courts would benefit from
making this one materiality factor a dispositive bright-line rule. For when it
is determined the government had actual knowledge of a contractor’s
alleged noncompliance with an express or implied obligation and continued
to pay the contractor, the claim should fail for lack of materiality.
By having a reasonable and limited method to dismiss frivolous or
insufficient FCA claims, federal courts could easily clear up some of their
dockets.340 Furthermore, this rule would enable government contractors
to more easily plan out a defense to FCA liability.341 During discovery,
contractors would know to specifically look for evidence of the
government’s actual knowledge of the alleged violation and the
government’s continued payment or inaction despite this knowledge. Thus,
the bright-line rule is consistent with the Escobar Court noting that FCA
claims must meet the heightened standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (9)(b).342 Courts would then be able to easily rule on motions
to dismiss or for summary judgment in instances when the government had
actual knowledge of a violation and, despite its knowledge, continued to pay
the contractor.
C. Public Policies This Bright-Line Rule Would Promote
It is obvious that the general public policy behind the FCA is to prevent
contractors from defrauding the federal treasury.343 It is smart the
339. See Italiano, supra note 63, at 1960 (discussing an emerging trend among federal courts to
focus on the government’s conduct once it is determined the government had knowledge of a
contractor’s noncompliance or violation of an obligation).
340. See generally Robert T. Rhoad & David Robbins, Fraud, Debarment and Suspension—Part I:
Fraud, 2019 GOV’T CONT. YEAR IN REV. BRIEFS 25, 25 (charting the total number of cases by fiscal
year and showing 767 new FCA cases filed in 2018).
341. See G. Christian Roux & John D. Hanover, Implied False Certification Liability Under the False
Claims Act: How the Materiality Standard Offers Protection After Escobar, 38 CONSTR. LAW. 16, 21 (2018)
(concluding an “effective defense” to an FCA complaint to be a showing of the alleged violations
immateriality on the government’s decision to pay the contractor).
342. See Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2004
n.6 (2016), (noting the materiality analysis is not “too fact intensive,” allowing for summary judgment
in FCA cases, and noting that FCA cases must meet the heightened standard of Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); see also FED. R. CIV. P. (9)(b) (describing what a party must plead when the
party is stating a claim involving fraud).
343. See Douglas K. Rosenblum & John A. Schwab, FCA 101 A Practitioner’s Guide to the False
Claims Act, CRIM. JUST. 26, 28–29 (discussing how the history of the FCA shows the intention behind
the Act is to protect the government coffers from fraudulent government contractors).
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government protects taxpayer funds. Keeping with the public policy behind
the FCA, the bright-line rule posited by this Comment would promote a few
public policies which would help prevent future FCA violations. First, the
rule would incentivize contractors to disclose any noncompliance of express
or implied obligations to the government. Second, the rule would ensure
the government is more careful in paying potentially noncompliant
contractors. And third, this bright-line rule would provide a limited and
reasonable but necessary check on an incredibly powerful and broad federal
statute.
This rule would incentivize contractors to disclose violations to the
government because as soon as the government has actual knowledge of the
alleged fraud and does not cease paying the contractor, the contractor has a
viable defense to FCA liability.344 With this guaranteed defense to
incentivize them, contractors would likely be more open and honest in their
business dealings with the government. This incentivized reporting by
contractors would also diminish the government’s heavy reliance on
whistleblowers—who are economically incentivized—to report to the
government any misdeeds of a contracting company.345 By having a rule
incentivizing contractors to self-report their own violations, the government
becomes better equipped with knowledge to protect taxpayer funds.
Moreover, the federal government has openly called for contractors to
voluntarily disclose instances of violations or noncompliance and to assist
the government in investigating FCA claims.346
344. See Italiano, supra note 63, at 1969–77 (discussing the Escobar decision’s impact on the
health care industry as well as benefits and defenses to FCA liability provided by acts of self-disclosure).
345. See Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recoversover-28-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2018 [https://perma.cc/Y7A8-EW6K] (describing
how much money the Justice Department recovered in 2018, and noting that whistleblowers filed 645
FCA claims in 2018); Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion From False Claims Act in Fiscal Year 2017,
supra note 1 (describing how much money the Justice Department recovered from FCA claims in 2017,
and pointing out that whistleblowers filed 669 FCA claims and earned a total of $392 million that year);
Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billionfalse-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016 [https://perma.cc/8T2G-JUJE] (discussing how much money
the Justice Department recovered from FCA cases in 2016, and noting that, in 2016, whistleblowers
brought 702 FCA claims and earned a total of $519 million).
346. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ISSUES GUIDANCE ON FALSE CLAIMS
ACT MATTERS AND UPDATES JUSTICE MANUAL, (2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
department-justice-issues-guidance-false-claims-act-matters-and-updates-justice-manual
[https://
perma.cc/79BC-TNDZ] (promoting the Justice Departments guidance and incentives for contractors
to voluntarily disclose information about potential violations or instances of noncompliance).
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Even the FCA itself allows for reduced damages when contractors selfreport violations under the Act.347 The bright-line rule offered in this
Comment, however, would likely prevent many FCA violations from
happening at all. By incentivizing contractors to report any noncompliance
with an express or implied obligation, the government and contractor would
have more time to remedy the situation before the contractor actually
violates the FCA.
As the Supreme Court held in Escobar, the FCA was never intended to
prosecute garden variety contractual disputes.348 The FCA is very broad
and powerful. The Act’s penalties are seemingly merciless.349 However,
despite the Court’s check on the scope of the Act, numerous FCA claims
are filed each year.350 Not all of these claims are victorious for the
government or relator.351 This means the FCA is being used to, or at least
is being used in an attempt to, prosecute inconsequential or insubstantial
contract disputes.
The bright-line rule posited here, making one of the Escobar materiality
factors dispositive, would provide a reasonable and limited check on the
Act. The rule would protect government contractors from facing costly
FCA litigation in instances when their alleged violations were not actually
material to the government’s payment decision. The claim would
automatically fail because the government already knew about the alleged
violation and has shown through its actions that it does not care about the
violation in rendering its payment decision. Thus, a bright-line rule as
posited here would ensure the FCA is utilized properly while promoting
public policy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit correctly held when the government has actual
knowledge of a contractor’s alleged violation and continues to pay the
contractor, the continued payment is substantial evidence that the violation
347. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2009).
348. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003.
349. See Margolis, supra note 1, at 27 (describing the severity of the FCA’s punishments).
350. See generally Fraud Statistics - Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/civil/
page/file/1080696/download?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/9Y
ZL-SWC8] (listing the total number of cases brought by the government and relators from October 1,
1987 to September 30, 2018, which shows that a total of 2,448 FCA cases were brought between 2016
and 2018).
351. See United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 669–70 (5th Cir. 2017)
(holding against the relator).
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was immaterial to the government’s payment decision.352
The
Ninth Circuit held to the contrary based off precedent overruled by
Escobar.353 The bright-line rule posited in this Comment mirrors the
Fifth Circuit’s position. It makes just one of the Escobar materiality factors
dispositive. The rule offered here advances public policy in a limited and
reasonable manner and eases the burden courts face in presiding over the
numerous FCA cases each year.
Overall, the bright-line rule offered in this Comment is a perfect fit for
the post-Escobar landscape because it would promote sound public policies
for both contractors and the government. The rule is only applicable in
limited circumstances. The rule is reasonably based on an almost universal
legal principal that for fraud or misrepresentation to be material it must be
influential on the recipient’s actions. More so, a growing number of federal
circuits are interpreting the Escobar materiality factors in a manner that is
similar to this offered bright-line rule. And, most importantly, the rule is in
line with the Escobar Court’s holding on the materiality of an FCA claim.

352. See id. at 665–70 (holding the government’s actual knowledge of the contractor’s alleged
omission and its continued payment to the contractor showed overwhelming evidence that the alleged
omission was not in any way material to the government’s payment decision).
353. See United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 905 (9th Cir. 2017)
(holding materiality can be found when the government has actual knowledge of the contractor’s
alleged violation and continues payment to the contractor).
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